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Abstract
Multinational and multiproduct firms often experience uncertainty in the relative re-
turn of conducting activities in different markets due to, for example, exchange rate volatil-
ity or the changing prospects of different products. We study how a multi-divisional orga-
nization should optimally allocate decision-making authority to its managerial members
when operating in such volatile markets. To be able to adapt its decisions to local con-
ditions, the organization has to rely on self-interested division managers to collect and
disseminate the relevant information. We show that if communication takes the form of
verifiable disclosure, then centralized decision-making does not suffer from information
asymmetry and it allows the headquarter of the organization to better cope with the
inter-market uncertainty. However, a downside of centralization is that it can discourage
information acquisition, and this negative effect is amplified by the need for coordinating
the activities of different divisions. As a result, the optimality of decentralized decision-
making can actually be driven by a large coordination motive.
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1 Introduction
Many modern organizations operate in multiple markets. The most immediate example, per-
haps, is that of multiproduct firms: Apple offers both smartphones and watches, BMW sells
both cars and motorcycles, and Google’s business is not restricted to running a search engine.
In the era of globalization, multinational firms provide another important case in point. Ac-
cording to a recent study by Lincoln and McCallum (2018), the median number of destination
countries for U.S. exporting firms was three in 2006. Moreover, for many top U.S. exporters,
selling domestically produced goods to foreign consumers only counts as a limited part of their
involvement in the world economy. For instance, it is common nowadays for a multinational
corporation to own production facilities in several foreign countries.1
Motivated by the prevalence and increasing influence of multibusiness firms in the economy,
this paper asks the following question: When local markets (defined by products, industries,
geographic boundaries, demographics of targeted customers, etc.) feature uncertainty in their
relative profitability, how should a multi-divisional organization optimally allocate decision-
making authority to its managerial members? In particular, should decision rights be centralized
to a headquarter manager who can coordinate the activities of different division contingent
on the market prospects, or be decentralized to division managers who have advantages in
collecting costly information about local market conditions?2
The uncertainty in relative market profitability is a highly relevant problem for many orga-
nizations. A broad set of economic and political conditions, which may be difficult to predict,
can affect how rewarding it is to conduct activities in a product market or in a country. Thus,
the value of success in a particular local market in terms of overall organizational performance
is uncertain from the central management’s perspective. For multinational firms, a major
source of such uncertainty is the volatility of currency exchange rates.3 With physically dif-
ferent products, uncertainty regarding the relative profitability or strategic importance of the
markets may also be due to general shifts in consumer tastes or changes in market size.4
If the organizational activities in different local markets are unrelated, relative changes
1For an overview of the stylized facts about multinational firms documented in the international trade
literature, see, e.g., the comprehensive survey by Antràs and Yeaple (2014).
2The design of multi-divisional organizations is an active area of research. See, e.g., Athey and Roberts
(2001), Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008, 2015), Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2010), Friebel and
Raith (2010), and Rantakari (2008, 2013). Section 6 reviews several prominent contributions in this growing
literature. We refer interested readers to the excellent survey by Roberts and Saloner (2013).
3For example, even without considering the change in tariffs due to the U.S. - China trade war, the recent
sharp depreciation of Chinese Yuan already implies a drop in the dollar value per sale that Ford can collect
from its joint venture in China (Changan Ford).
4Making precise predictions about these factors can be challenging even for large firms. In 2013, soon after
announcing his stepping down as the CEO of Microsoft, Steve Ballmer openly admitted that the company was
too slow to recognize the importance of the smartphone market. He blamed this strategic failure on Microsoft’s
long-time focus on the business of its Windows operating system (see “Microsoft too slow on phones, admits
boss Steve Ballmer”, BBC News, 20 September 2013).
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in market profitability may be of little relevance for central management. However, quite
often an organization can benefit from synchronizing its activities across markets (e.g., because
of economies of scale), though doing so may imply that these activities are less adapted to
the local conditions of each market (e.g., product design is less fitted to the tastes of local
consumers). When the prospect of each market cannot be perfectly forecasted, resolving the
trade-off between coordination and adaptation is particularly challenging, because ex ante it
is unclear whether the organization should adapt more to one market’s local conditions and
less to the other’s. By centralizing the decision-making process, the headquarter manager
can take into account the actual profitability conditions and make contingent decisions that
are globally optimal for the organization. Yet, to the extent that local market information is
privately acquired and observed by division managers, the flexibility granted by centralization
also comes with a downside. That is, it may harm the incentives of the division managers by
making them more skeptical about how their acquired information will be used.
The main insight of our paper is that whether the above cost of centralized decision-making
may outweigh its benefit depends crucially on how important coordination is compared to
adaptation, and in an unexpected way. In particular, due to a reinforcing interaction between
the uncertainty in market profitability and the need for coordination, the optimality of a
decentralized authority structure can be the result of a large coordination motive. In addition,
as an important step toward establishing the optimality results, we show that if the information
acquired by the division managers is verifiable, complete voluntary disclosure arises as a unique
equilibrium outcome irrespective of the chosen authority structure.
We formalize our arguments by modeling an organization which needs to adapt and coor-
dinate the strategic decisions of its two divisions. As in Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari
(2008), a division’s performance is determined by how close its action (e.g., the design of a
product) is matched to an unobserved local state, and how well it is coordinated with the action
of the other division. Specifically, any mismatch between division i’s action and its local state
or division j’s action will result a quadratic loss in i’s performance. Each division is run by an
agent (e.g., a divisional manager, he) who can privately exert effort to acquire a signal about
the local state, where more effort results in a better signal. The agents are led by a common
and uninformed principal (e.g., a headquarter manager, she). While each agent cares only
about the performance of his own division, possibly because of career concerns, the principal
cares about the overall performance of the organization. The novel feature of our model is
that the contribution of each division’s success to the overall organizational performance need
not be certain. This idea is formally captured by a pair of stochastic weights that the princi-
pal’s payoff attaches to the divisions’ performances. While these weights are observed by all
players before the final actions are taken, they are unknown at the outset of the game and
can be arbitrarily correlated. As mentioned, examples of such interrelated uncertainty include
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the exchange rate volatility incurred by multinational corporations, as well as the constantly
changing prospects of different product markets. We refer to these stochastic weights as the
global states of our model because, unlike the local states, they determine which actions are
globally optimal for the organization rather than locally optimal for individual divisions.
We compare two widely-studied authority structures: centralization and decentralization.
In both cases the agents first exert efforts to acquire information about the local states, and then
they communicate their findings with the player(s) endowed with decision-making authority.
Specifically, under centralization, the agents simultaneously report to the principal, who will
subsequently dictate the actions of both divisions. Under decentralization, the agents can
exchange messages with each other, after which they make independent decisions over the
actions of their own divisions.5 The communication between players is strategic and takes
the form of verifiable disclosure, where an informed agent always has the option of certifying
the outcome of his information experiment. This includes the persuasion game of Milgrom
(1981) and Grossman (1981) and the evidence game of Dye (1985) as special cases. Previous
works have argued that the quality of communication is important for explaining the relative
performance of different organizational structures (e.g. Alonso et al., 2008; Aoki, 1986; Dessein
and Santos, 2006; Rantakari, 2008). Our model predicts that if information is verifiable, the
incentive constraints for communication are irrelevant in determining where the authority over
decisions should be lodged in the organization. As we prove in Section 3, fully revealing
communication arises as a unique equilibrium outcome regardless of which authority structure is
chosen (Propositions 1 - 4). Thus, in equilibrium all the obtained information will be truthfully
transmitted to the decision-making parties. The full-revelation result is not obvious, because
it is known that costly information acquisition and/or uncertain information endowment can
prevent complete voluntary disclosure (e.g., Shavell, 1994; Shin, 1994).6
While the resulting quality of communication does not differ between centralization and
decentralization, the allocation of decision rights does have an impact on the agents’ incentives
for information gathering. In Section 4, we first establish a benchmark result (Theorem 1(i))
that if the local markets are always equally profitable, then, regardless of the importance of
coordination, a centralized organization always outperforms its decentralized counterpart in
motivating information acquisition. This optimality of centralized decision-making shows that
the incentive view of delegation in Aghion and Tirole (1997) need not be valid in multi-agent
settings with coordination motives. Intuitively, as the principal always deems the two divisions
5The comparison between centralization and decentralization is only meaningful if contracts are incomplete
as in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), because otherwise any decentralized allocation
can be implemented centrally by a suitably designed mechanism. Thus, similar to Alonso et al. (2008) and
Rantakari (2008), our analysis applies to situations where the organizational decisions of interests are sufficiently
complex (e.g., product design), which renders ex ante contracting infeasible.
6Moreover, as shown in Section 5.2, if the space of the local states is unbounded and the agents are able to
misrepresent their private information at a cost, then in addition to full revelation the equilibria under different
authority structures will also feature language inflation (Kartik, 2009; Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani, 2007).
3
equally important, under centralization she acts as if she were a neutral party who aims to
maximize the joint surplus of the agents. In contrast, the decentralized equilibrium outcome
fails to achieve the same efficiency because of the conflicting interests between the agents. This
coordination failure lowers the marginal benefit of information and thus discourages information
acquisition under decentralization. Hence, given the fully revealing communication equilibrium
outcome, the principal is better off retaining the decision rights when doing so can motivate
the agents to acquire more information.7
Since the local markets are symmetric ex ante, the equal-profitability condition in the
benchmark result above is satisfied if and only if the global states are perfectly and positively
correlated. This is a knife-edge case, and the picture changes as soon as we move away from it.
A key finding of our paper, stated in Theorem 1(ii), is that provided there is any uncertainty
in the relative profitability of the local markets, decentralization will outperform centralization
in terms of information gathering if coordination is sufficiently important. To understand the
result, note that under centralization the principal would prioritize the adaptation problem
of the division that turns out to be more profitable. The information passed on by the less
profitable division may thus receive little attention. Not surprisingly, since (i) the agents
cannot perfectly forecast the relative profitability of the local markets ex ante and (ii) the
loss from mis-adapting to one’s local state is convex, the uncertainty in the ex post value of
information tends to discourage information gathering. What is less obvious, perhaps, is the
following reinforcing interaction between this negative effect and the need for coordination.
As coordination becomes more important, knowledge about local market conditions plays less
of a role in the principal’s choice of actions. However, since the adaptation problem of the
more profitable division is still relatively more important, the decrease of influence in decision-
making is more substantial for the less profitable division. Hence, compared to the case where
the agents are autonomous, a large coordination motive can be much more harmful for their
information-gathering incentives when the principal is in charge.
Next, in Theorem 2, we show that if the distribution of the global states is sufficiently
volatile, then the agents would also acquire more information under decentralization when
coordination is of little importance relative to adaptation. Further, by fully characterizing
the cases where the global states are binomially distributed, we demonstrate that with high
volatility the comparative advantage of decentralization in motivating information acquisition
may even hold regardless of the importance of coordination (Propositions 5 and 6). Thus, the
more volatile the local markets, the larger the motivational benefits of decentralization.
7The optimality result of centralized decision-making echoes the recent experimental findings by Brandts
and Cooper (2018). Assigning the subjects with different managerial roles and endowing them with exogenous
information, their experimental design simulates how two parallel divisional decisions are made in an orga-
nization. They find that the subjects are surprisingly honest in communication and that the organizational
performance is higher when decision rights are allocated to a central manager.
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Whether and when the above benefits of decentralization can outweigh the cost of losing
control is not obvious, because it is exactly when the local markets are highly volatile that the
principal would most appreciate the flexibility granted by centralization. We show in Theo-
rems 3 and 4 that the answer depends largely on the convexity of the information cost . If
the information cost is sufficiently convex, the additional gain in information quality from de-
centralization is at most minor, so it would not be optimal for the principal to transfer the
decision rights to the agents. However, if the cost of information is not too convex, the drop
in information quality due to centralization is substantial enough to make decentralization
optimal. Then, given that strong coordination motives widen the gap in information quality
between centralization and decentralization, we arrive at the novel prediction that the impor-
tance of coordinating organizational activities can actually strengthen rather than weaken the
optimality of decentralized decision-making.
Our results have direct implications on how formal authority over critical decisions should
be allocated between organizational agents, which is a design architecture central to the stories
of success (or failure) of many modern corporations.8 More broadly, the results are also related
to the core debate in economics on the role of (de)centralized systems in information aggrega-
tion and decision-making. Perhaps most famously and influentially, Friedrich von Hayek argued
that the problem of rapid adaptation to local changes must be solved by “some form of decen-
tralization” (Hayek, 1945, p. 524), since knowledge about local conditions is dispersed among
individual agents rather than existing in concentrated form. However, if adaptation decisions
are interdependent and their relative importance is uncertain, efficient use of information may
also require some centralized coordination. We show that centralized decision-making need not
suffer from the information asymmetry that Hayek criticized, and it is indeed more efficient in
adapting to existing information. However, decentralization can still be optimal once the en-
dogeneity of information is taken into account. This suggests that the fundamental advantage
of decentralized systems is in information production.
Our results can shed light on some business cases of multi-divisional corporations. For ex-
ample, it has been widely discussed that Japan’s multinational mobile phone makers perform
very poorly in the overseas markets.9 In particular, many of them, such as NEC and Pana-
8See, for example, Freeland (2001) on the history of General Motors in the 1920’s - 1960’s. Narrative
evidence supporting the importance of authority allocations for organizational performance includes the reform
of decision-making structure that Louis Gerstner implemented soon after he became the CEO of IBM, which is
considered to be a key factor that lead to the firm’s success in the 1990’s. See, for instance, Gerstner’s memoir
of his tenure in IBM (Gerstner, 2002) as well as the discussion by Malone (2004). Another case in point is the
remarkable failure of the merger of Chrysler and Daimler in 1998. As convincingly argued by Garicano and
Rayo (2016), a fatal problem of the merged company, DaimlerChrysler AG, was its poorly-designed allocation of
authority. For more systematic empirical evidence, see, e.g., Aghion, Bloom, Lucking, Sadun, and Van Reenen
(2017), and Thomas (2011).
9See, e.g., online articles “Why Japan’s cellphones haven’t gone global?”, New York Times, 19 July 2009,
“What happened to Japan’s electronic giants?”, BBC News, 2 April 2013, and “NEC and the sorrow of Japan”,
Boy Genius Report, 17 July 2013.
5
sonic, were already struggling in the global competition in the 2000s, which was even before
the smartphone era. Their unsatisfactory performance may be explained by the traditional
centralized decision-making process of Japanese multinationals (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2002;
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2012) and the large economies of scale of the mobile phone
industry. For instance, from their entry to China in 1995 until 2002, NEC and Panasonic
“released only a few models that were adapted from their models in Japan” (Marukawa, 2009,
p. 428). This practice probably had a lot to do with the fact that many components of the
Japanese phones were manufactured domestically rather than overseas in low-wage countries,
so the cost-saving benefit from coordinating the choices of handset models across borders could
be especially significant. But then, according to our theory it is not surprising that these phone
makers were slow in learning some basic differences in the distribution structures and consumer
tastes between Japan and China (see, e.g., Marukawa, 2009). Both NEC and Panasonic with-
drew their mobile phone business from China around 2006, and from the entire global market
around 2013.
Of course, centralization is not always inferior to decentralization. For example, for a
company that sells both smartphones and personal computers (e.g., Apple and Microsoft),
there may be very limited benefits from coordinating the design of these two products because
they are supposed to serve different consumer needs. In that case, our theory suggests that it
is unlikely that empowering the product managers would lead to much more informed decision-
making. Thus, it is more important that the allocation of decision rights does not constrain the
company’s ability to react promptly to the changing prospects of different products (e.g., by
allocating resources across divisions). This may help to understand why Steve Ballmer decided
to massively reorganize Microsoft in 2013, moving the governance of the company closer to its
very centralized peer Apple.10
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 character-
izes the equilibria under different organizational structures. Building on the characterization
results, Section 4 studies the optimal organizational structure. Section 5 presents two exten-
sions, one concerning the roles of monetary transfers (Section 5.1), while the other considers
imperfectly verifiable information (Section 5.2). Section 6 discusses the related literature, and
Section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to Appendices A and B.
2 The Model
An organization consists of two operating divisions, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. Division i’s performance
(e.g., profits/sales generated, number of patents obtained) is determined by its local conditions,
10See “Microsoft overhauls, the Apple way”, New York Times, 11 July 2013.
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described by θi ∈ R, and two actions y = (y1, y2) ∈ R2:
pii(y, θi) = K − (yi − θi)2 − δ(y1 − y2)2,
where K > 0 is some constant, and δ > 0 measures the importance of coordinating actions
within the organization. Each local state θi is independently and identically distributed ac-
cording to a commonly known distribution Γ with support Θ ⊆ R. We normalize the mean of
the distribution to zero (E[θi] = 0) and assume that it has a finite variance σ2θ = E[θ2i ] > 0.
Each division i is run by an agent (e.g., a division manager, he), which we will refer to as
agent i. Before any action is taken, each agent i can privately invest effort ei ∈ E = [0, 1] in
acquiring information about the local state of his division. Specifically, by choosing an effort
level ei ∈ E, agent i incurs a cost of c(ei) and receives a perfectly revealing signal si = θi with
probability ei. With probability 1−ei, the agent receives a null signal si = ∅. Thus, the agent’s
effort enhances the probability that the true state will be revealed by the signal (Green and
Stokey, 1981).11 The realization of the signal is referred to as the agent’s type. We assume
a twice-differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex cost function c : E → R+. Each
agent cares about the performance of his own division. In particular, the ex post payoff of
agent i is given by
ui(y, θi, ei) = qpii(y, θi)− c(ei),
where q > 0 captures the marginal benefit for the agent to increase his division’s performance
(e.g., price of sales, monetary bonus, promotion opportunities). For analytical convenience,
we assume throughout the paper that the marginal cost of information is sufficiently small at
e = 0 (e.g., c′(0) < qσ2θ/2) and is sufficiently large at e = 1 (e.g., c′(1) > qσ2θ) to ensure an
interior solution ei ∈ (0, 1).
The agents are led by a common and uninformed principal (e.g., a headquarter manager,
she), whose payoff depends on the performance of both divisions and a stochastic vector η =
(η1, η2):
piP (y,θ,η) = η1pi1(y, θ1) + η2pi2(y, θ2). (2.1)
Thus, ηi measures the marginal benefit for the principal from increasing division i’s perfor-
mance. As we have discussed in the introduction, there are many economic scenarios where
the principal may care about the performance of different divisions to different extents (i.e.,
11The assumption that an agent’s can only acquire an “all-or-nothing” signal simplifies the analysis,
but it is not crucial. Our main results can be extended to more general settings where the precision of
the signal is increasing in the agent’s effort, in the sense that the expectation of the conditional variance
σ2θi|si = E
[
(θi − E[θi|si])2
]
is decreasing in ei.
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η1 6= η2). In the context of multinational corporations, pii can be profits measured in country
i’s currency, and ηi is the currency exchange rate between country i and the country where
the headquarter is located. Another interpretation is that pii is a measure (e.g., market share)
which summarizes the firm’s performance in market i relative to its competitors, while ηi re-
flects demand uncertainty such as changes in market size or in preference intensity (“fashion”).
Alternatively, if pii and q are the number and the price of sales in product market i, then we
may have ηi = q− γi, where γi ≥ 0 is the per unit cost for the headquarter to supply division i
with necessary resources. Finally, we may instead assume that ηi = q + γi, and then interpret
γi as a parameter that captures (in reduced-form) the strategic importance of succeeding in
product market i (e.g., gaining competitive advantage through brand-building or consumer
habit-forming).12
We assume that the random variables η1 and η2 are drawn according to some symmetric
and commonly known joint probability distribution F (η1, η2) on the support
[
η, η¯
]2, where
η¯ > η > 0. The values of η1 and η2 are realized and publicly observed after the agents
have acquired information about their local states (θ1, θ2) and before the decisions (y1, y2) are
taken.13 The uncertainty due to (η1, η2) is different from the uncertainty coming from the local
states (θ1, θ2). First, unlike the local states, η1 and η2 are not required to be independently
distributed, reflecting the observation that various economic environments are correlated, pos-
sibly in a rather complex way (e.g., when η1 and η2 are currency exchange rates). Second, from
the principal’s perspective, how the decision rules of different divisions should be optimally in-
terlinked is determined by the relative value of η1 and η2. If, for example, η1 > η2, the principal
would prefer agent 1 to adapt more aggressively towards his local state and agent 2 to focus
more on coordination. In other words, η1 and η2 determine which actions are globally optimal
for the organization rather than locally optimal for individual divisions. We will therefore refer
to them as the global states of our game. All model parameters are common knowledge.
We complete the model description by specifying how exactly information is communicated
and decisions are taken under centralization and decentralization, respectively. Under cen-
tralization, the principal takes the decisions (y1, y2) after communicating with both agents.14
Under decentralization, each agent takes the decision of his own division after communicating
with each other. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of events in our model.
12The specification of the utility function (2.1) is also open to the “behavioral” interpretation that the
principal has some intrinsic biases and thus favors the two agents unequally. This interpretation relates our
model to the growing literature on behaviorally biased managers/supervisors. See, e.g., Prendergast and Topel
(1996), Giebe and Gürtler (2012), and Letina, Liu, and Netzer (2018).
13Information about (η1, η2) may also arrive exogenously before the agents have exerted efforts. Here, an
implicit assumption is that such information can be summarized in the common prior F .
14As will become clear in Section 3.2, our main results hold regardless of whether the uncertainty of (η1, η2)
resolves before or after the agents communicate with the principal under centralization.
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Decision rights
are allocated
t
Agents choose
efforts (e1, e2)
Signals (s1, s2)
are observed
Messages (m1,m2)
are communicated
States (η1, η2)
are disclosed
Actions (y1, y2)
are taken
Figure 1: Timing of Events
Independent of the allocation of decision rights, we assume that in the communication stage
the agents can credibly reveal their findings about the local states if they want to do so. In
particular, conditional on receiving a signal si ∈ S = Θ ∪ {∅}, agent i can send a message
mi ∈ M(si) to either agent j (under decentralization) or the principal (under centralization),
where we denote M = ∪si∈SM(si) and assume that the signal-dependent message spaces
satisfy the condition below.15
(A1) ∅ ∈ M(∅), and ∀si 6= ∅, ∃msi ∈M(si) \ ∪s′i 6=siM(s′i).
The essential requirement of assumption (A1) is that an informed agent can always certify
his type (Seidmann and Winter, 1997). In particular, whenever the message msi is communi-
cated, the receiving party will know for sure that agent i has learned the value of the local state
θi, which is equal to si. However, since the message m = ∅ is not necessarily only available to
type ∅, (A1) allows the possibility that an agent may not be able to prove that he is uninformed.
The assumption thus accomodates a large class of communication games. For example, it is
satisfied by the evidence game introduced by Dye (1985), whereM(si) = {si, ∅} ∀si ∈ S, i.e.,
the agents can always hide but cannot fake their findings about the local conditions. It is also
satisfied by the persuasion game studied by Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), and Milgrom
and Roberts (1986), whereM(si) = {S ⊆ S : si ∈ S} ∀si ∈ S, i.e., the agents cannot lie but
they may send “vague” messages about their findings. Finally, while (A1) rules out pure cheap
talk communication, it nevertheless permits the following game of cheap talk with certification:
∅ ∈ M(∅), andM(si) = S ∪{csi} if si 6= ∅, where csi 6= cs′i ∀si 6= s′i. The interpretation is that
agent i can either send a non-verifiable message to claim that his type is s˜i ∈ S, or provide a
certification to truthfully reveal the signal he has received. However, such a certification is not
necessarily available when the agent has failed to obtain any informative signal.
We are interested in how the overall organizational performance is shaped by the interac-
tion between authority allocation and the model’s primitives, in particular δ and F (i.e, the
coordination motive and the uncertainty/volatility of local market profitability). To answer
15Games with signal-independent message spaces (Mi(si) = S ∀si ∈ S) and costly lying are studied in
Section 5.2.
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this question, we first derive and analyze the respective perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE; Fu-
denberg and Tirole, 1991, p. 333) of the games under centralization and decentralization (see
Section 3). We show that under either of the two organizational structures, full revelation of
agents’ private signals can always be sustained as part of an equilibrium. Moreover, this is
essentially the unique equilibrium outcome of the communication game. We then characterize
(i) the agents’ effort provision and (ii) the principal’s expected payoff in the corresponding
PBE, which are uniquely pinned down given the full-revelation communication, and use them
to measure the performance of the organization. The main results on the optimal allocation of
decision rights are presented in Section 4.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Decentralized authority
We first analyze the game under decentralization. As mentioned, decentralization means that
each agent has full control over the decision of his own division. Since the global states (η1, η2)
only affect the principal’s payoff, they are irrelevant for the agents’ incentives under decentral-
ization.
Formally, the strategy of each agent i ∈ {1, 2} is a triple (edi ,mdi , ydi ) where edi ∈ E is his
effort to acquire decision-relevant information, mdi is a mapping that specifies for every given
effort-signal pair (ei, si) which message mdi (ei, si) ∈ M(si) agent i will send to agent j, and
ydi is a decision rule specifying the agent’s action ydi (ei, si,mi,mj) conditional on the effort-
signal pair (ei, si) and the messages (mi,mj). In equilibrium, each agent i’s choices of effort,
messages and actions must be sequentially rational with respect to his beliefs (about θi, ej and
sj), which are formed using Bayes’ rule whenever applicable. In addition, since the message
sets are signal-dependent, we further require that for every mj ∈ M agent i’s posterior belief
about agent j’s signal sj, which we denote by µji (·|mj) ∈ ∆(S), must be consistent (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1986). Mathematically, this requires that µji (Smj |mj) = 1 ∀mj ∈ M, where
Smj = {sj ∈ S : mj ∈ M(sj)} is the set of signals which could possibly make the message mj
available to agent j.
Our first proposition shows that under decentralization there is essentially a unique equi-
librium outcome of the communication stage: despite the conflicts of interests, both agents are
incentivized to reveal all their private information.
Proposition 1. Consider the decentralized authority structure.
(i) Suppose that ∀m ∈ M, Sm is closed. Then, there exists a fully revealing PBE in which
mdi (ei, si) = m
si and mdi (ei, ∅) = ∅, ∀si ∈ Θ, ∀ei ∈ E,∀i = 1, 2.
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(ii) If a communication strategy m∗i is part of a PBE, then µij ({si}|m∗i (e∗i , si)) = 1 for almost
all si ∈ S \ {0, ∅} with respect to Γ.
The existence of a fully revealing equilibrium is not obvious. In particular, it is known
that complete voluntary disclosure need not arise in equilibrium when information is costly to
acquire (e.g., Shavell, 1994) and/or when the possibility that the sender is uninformed cannot
be ruled out (e.g., Shin, 1994). To gain the intuition for Proposition 1(i), consider an agent i
who observes si > 0 (and thus knows θi) and contemplates a deviation from the fully revealing
strategy mdi . As we require in the proof, agent j always assumes the worst in the spirit of
Milgrom and Roberts (1986): for every message mi ∈M observed, j would think that i’s type
is for sure smi ∈ argminsi∈Smi
∣∣E[θi|si]∣∣, i.e., the one that minimizes the distance between j’s
posterior and prior expectations about θi among all types who have access to the message mi.
This implies that by deviating to any message mi 6= msi , i could only manipulate j to think
that on average the local state θi is lower than si (i.e., E[θi|mi] ≤ si).
Now imagine, for the sake of the argument, that agent i knows that j has either received
a signal sj = ∅ or sj = θj ≤ θi. Given that the sequentially rational action for agent j
is a weighted average of his posterior expectations of θj and yi, the above manipulation is
not profitable for agent i because it will mislead j to take an action even further away from
what would have been ideal for i. In contrast, if agent j is known to have received a signal
sj = θj > θi, deceiving j to underestimate the value of θi could be tempting for agent i, since
it may move j’s action closer to i’s local state θi than what j would have chosen otherwise.
Of course, as the communication game is simultaneous, when deciding which message to send
agent i does not know which of the above two cases j’s signal falls into. However, since
E [θj] = 0 and θi = si > 0, agent i does know that either or both of the followings must
hold: (i) Pr(θj ≤ θi) ≥ Pr(θj > θi), i.e., a priori θj ≤ θi is a more likely scenario compared to
θj > θi; (ii)
∣∣E[θj|θj ≤ θi]∣∣ ≥ E[θj|θj > θi], i.e., the distribution Γ assigns a substantial weight
to values that are far smaller than θi. Hence, on average the losses from mis-coordination and
mis-adaptation are minimized when agent i reveals his type by sending the message msi to j.16
The second part of Proposition 1 establishes that full revelation of private information is
essentially the unique prediction of the communication game under decentralization. In any
equilibrium, after the bilateral communication the agents can always be (almost) sure about
each other’s types, except possibly when the distribution Γ admits an atom at θi = 0 and an
agent may use the same message for types 0 and ∅. However, this exception is not payoff-
relevant because knowing whether si = 0 or si = ∅ will not affect the subsequent decisions
of the agents. If the distribution Γ is discrete, then the result can be proved by adapting the
16One may envision invoking the general results of Hagenbach, Koessler, and Perez-Richet (2014) to prove
the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium in the current model. But their results are not directly applicable
to our problem because they do not consider endogenous information acquisition.
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well-known unraveling argument (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981). More specifically, in our
setting, if several types of agent i are using the same message m ∈ M, then at least one of
them, say si, would find that his finding is being understated (|E[θi|m]| < |E[θi|msi ]| = si).
Thus, by deviating to the type-revealing message msi agent i could convince j to take decisions
that are more favorable to i in expectation. In the proof, we show how this intuitive argument
can be generalized to arbitrary distributions, including the ones that are partly discrete and
partly continuous.
Given that the private signals are truthfully revealed in equilibrium, the decision rules
(yd1 , yd2) are uniquely pinned down on the equilibrium path. Thus, when calculating the expected
payoffs of the agents, the decision rules can be written as functions of the private signals
s = (s1, s2) only. Taking these action functions and agent j’s effort ej as given, agent i then
solves the following maximization problem at the information acquisition stage:
max
ei∈[0,1]
Udi (ei, ej) = Eθ
[
Es
[
ui
(
yd1(s), y
d
2(s), θi, ei
] ∣∣ei, ej]] . (3.1)
It turns out that (3.1) admits a unique solution edi ∈ (0, 1), which is independent of the
effort choice of agent j. Hence, the equilibrium outcome at the information acquisition stage
is also unique under decentralization. The findings about the stages of decision-making and
information acquisition are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. In any fully revealing PBE under decentralization, the on-path equilibrium
decisions are given by
ydi (si, sj) =
1 + δ
1 + 2δ
· E[θi|si] + δ
1 + 2δ
· E[θj|sj], ∀i, j = 1, 2.
In addition, both agents exert the same effort
ed1 = e
d
2 = e
d ≡ (c′)−1
((
1− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
qσ2θ
)
.
Thus, the equilibrium effort level ed is increasing in q and σ2θ . Intuitively, this is because
an increase in q or σ2θ leads to a larger expected loss of being uninformed. Further, as formally
shown in Appendix A.5 , ed is decreasing in δ. This is also intuitive: a higher need for
coordination makes adaptation less important from the agents’ perspective and thus decreases
the value of information.
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3.2 Centralized authority
In this section, we analyze the game under centralization. Recall that in this case the principal
has full control over the decisions of both divisions. Thus, in contrast to the case of decentral-
ization, when making their effort choices and communicating their signals, the agents take into
account how the global states (η1, η2) may affect the principal’s decisions.
Under centralization, each agent i’s strategy is a pair (eci ,mci), where eci ∈ E is his effort to
acquire information about his local state θi and mci is a mapping that specifies for every given
effort-signal pair (ei, si) which message mci(ei, si) he reports to the principal. The principal’s
strategy is a pair of mappings (yc1, yc2), where yci (mi,mj, η1, η2) is the action that the princi-
pal takes for division i when receiving messages (mi,mj) from the agents and observing the
global states (η1, η2). In equilibrium, each agent i chooses the effort level and signal-dependent
messages that maximize his expected payoff, and the principal chooses actions that are sequen-
tially rational with respect to his beliefs (about θ, s and e), which are formed using Bayes’
rule whenever applicable. Similar to the case of decentralization, we require that for every
mj ∈ M and j ∈ {1, 2} the principal’s posterior belief about agent j’s type, which we denote
by µjp (·|mj) ∈ ∆(S), must be consistent. That is, µjp (Smj |mj) = 1 ∀mj ∈M.
The next result parallels Proposition 1 in the previous section. It shows that the prin-
cipal need not be concerned about the agents strategically manipulating their reports under
centralization, as they are incentivized to fully reveal their private information in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Consider the centralized authority structure.
(i) Suppose that ∀m ∈ M, Sm is closed. Then, there exists a fully revealing PBE in which
mci(ei, si) = m
si and mci(ei, ∅) = ∅, ∀si ∈ Θ, ∀ei ∈ E,∀i = 1, 2.
(ii) If a communication strategy m∗i is part of a PBE, then µip ({si}|m∗i (e∗i , si)) = 1 for almost
all si ∈ S \ {0, ∅} with respect to Γ.
The intuition of Proposition 3 is similar to that of Proposition 1. Together, our full-
revelation results suggest that the allocation of decision rights does not affect the quality of
communication in the organization. This finding can even be extended to settings where the
message sets are type-independent. In Section 5.2 we show that fully revealing equilibria
also arise in a communication game with M(si) = S ∀si ∈ S and costly exaggeration. Our
results are in sharp contrast to Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008), who show that if
information about local states is dispersed and held by agents who communicate via cheap talk,
the relative performance of different authority structures depends crucially on their endogenous
quality of communication. Moreover, our results show that centralized decision-making does
not suffer from the usual problem of information asymmetry, as the principal can elicit all the
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information from the agents even without the help of contingent transfers. Thus, different from
related works such as Dessein (2002) and Deimen and Szalay (2018), strategic communication
does not give rise to a trade-off between loss of control under delegation/decentralization and
loss of information under centralization in our setting.
Given that the private signals are truthfully revealed in equilibrium, the principal’s decision
rules (yc1, yc2) are uniquely pinned down on the equilibrium path. Thus, when calculating the
expected payoffs of the agents, the decision rules can be written as functions of the private
signals s = (s1, s2) only. Especially, the action chosen by the principal for each division will
be a weighted sum of the conditional expectations E[θi|si] and E[θj|sj], while the weights will
depend on the realization of the global states. Taking the principal’s on-path decision rules
and agent j’s effort ej as given, agent i then solves the following maximization problem at the
information acquisition stage:
max
ei∈[0,1]
U ci (ei, ej) = Eθ [Es [Eη [ui(yc1(s,η), yc2(s,η), θi, ei)] |ei, ej]] . (3.2)
Similar to the parallel problem under decentralization, (3.2) admits a unique solution eci ∈ (0, 1),
which is independent of ej. Using the symmetry of the distribution of (η1, η2), we then obtain
the following result:
Proposition 4. In any fully revealing PBE under centralization, the on-path equilibrium de-
cisions are given by
yci (si, sj, ηi, ηj) =
ηi
ηi+ηj
·
(
ηj
ηi+ηj
+ δ
)
E [θi|si] + δηjηi+ηjE[θj|sj]
ηi
ηi+ηj
· ηj
ηi+ηj
+ δ
, ∀i, j = 1, 2.
In addition, both agents exert the same effort
ec1 = e
c
2 = e
c
F ≡ (c′)−1
((
1− Eλ
[
δ2(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2δλ2(1− λ)2
2(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ
)
,
where λ ≡ η1/(η1 + η2).17
Similar to the case of decentralization, the equilibrium effort level ecF is unambiguously
increasing in q and σ2θ . In addition, as we show in Appendix A.5, ecF is decreasing in δ.
Intuitively, the value of information decreases in the importance of coordination because it
17Note that the distribution of λ can be derived from the joint distribution of (η1, η2):
Pr(λ ≤ x) =
∫
[η,η¯]2
1{η1/(η1+η2)≤x}dF (η1, η2)∀x ∈ R.
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makes adaptation less important from the perspective of all players. It is less clear, however,
how the equilibrium effort level depends on the distribution of the global states (η1, η2). We
investigate this question in the next section as we compare the effort provision under both
organizational forms.
4 Comparing Organizational Structures
Having analyzed separately the fully revealing equilibria under centralization and decentral-
ization, we now ask which allocation of decision rights is optimal for the organization. In our
model, an immediate candidate for the criterion of optimality is the principal’s expected pay-
off. Since communication is fully revealing and the principal directly controls the divisional
decisions under centralization, a sufficient (necessary) condition for her to benefit more from
a centralized (decentralized) authority structure is the extent of the agents’ effort provision.18
Hence, comparing agents’ efforts under centralization and decentralization provides a useful
stepping stone for answering the question of which allocation of decision rights is optimal for
the principal. Moreover, the comparison of effort provision can be of interest per se, especially
if one is concerned that our model may not capture all the benefits of learning for the organi-
zation. With these motivations in mind, in what follows we will start by analyzing the relative
performance of the organization in terms of effort provision (Section 4.1). The analysis of the
principal’s expected payoff will then be presented in Section 4.2.
4.1 Effort provision
Propositions 2 and 4 directly imply that the equilibrium effort level is higher under decentral-
ization than that under centralization (ed > ecF ) if and only if
D(δ) =
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
< CF (δ) = E
[
δ2(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2δλ2(1− λ)2
2(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
]
, (4.1)
where we recall that λ = η1/(η1 + η2), and we drop the subscript λ from the expectation
operator for brevity.
To understand the above condition, note that when choosing his effort, an optimizing
agent balances the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of information. Condition (4.1)
is then equivalent to the statement that the marginal benefit of information is higher under
decentralization than that under centralization. More specifically, if the agent had the right to
choose actions for both divisions, he can always make sure that they are perfectly coordinated
(yj = yi). In this case, the expected benefit of exerting an additional unit of effort will
18If the set of feasible effort choices is binary and is given by E = {0, e¯}, where e¯ ∈ (0, 1], then ed > ecF is
not only necessary but also sufficient for concluding that the principal is better off under decentralization.
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be qσ2θ , which is exactly the payoff difference between taking an informed and ideal decision
(yi = θi) and an uninformed one (yi = E[θi]). When decision rights are decentralized, each
agent only has control over his own division, and coordination is no longer perfect due to
conflicting interests between the agents. Hence, from the agents’ perspective, the value of
information is impaired by the need of coordination, and so the marginal benefit of being better
informed decreases to MBd = (1 − D(δ))qσ2θ . Under centralization, the principal may better
coordinate the actions of the divisions. However, because the relative profitability of the local
markets (ηi/ηj) is uncertain, a forward-looking agent would be concerned that the principal
may prioritize the adaptation problem of the other division and thus pay little attention to
his acquired information. These effects jointly determine the marginal benefit of information
under centralization, which is MBc = (1− CF (δ))qσ2θ . It is then straightforward to check that
MBd > MBc if and only if (4.1) holds.
Exploiting the limiting properties of the functionsD(δ) and CF (δ) in (4.1), our first theorem
below shows that, except for the knife-edge case where the global states are perfectly and
positively correlated, a decentralized organization outperforms its centralized counterpart in
terms of incentivizing effort provision (or information gathering) whenever coordination is
sufficiently important.
Theorem 1. Let corr(η1, η2) be the correlation of the global states.
(i) If corr(η1, η2) = 1, then ed < ecF ∀δ > 0.
(ii) If corr(η1, η2) < 1, then ∃ δ¯ ∈ [0,+∞), such that ed > ecF ∀δ > δ¯. In addition, the
difference ed − ecF is increasing in δ ∀δ > δ¯.
To see the intuition, remember that under decentralization the agents are free to adjust
their actions according to the acquired information. However, as in many settings with partial
coordination motives and lack of commitment, the decentralized equilibrium outcome is not
Pareto efficient for the agents. In contrast, whenever the global states are perfectly and pos-
itively correlated, under centralization the principal acts as a neutral party maximizing both
agents’ payoffs. In this case, a centralized authority structure effectively allows the agents to
commit to the efficient action plans for any given information acquired. As a result, regardless
of the importance of coordination, from an individual agent’s perspective the marginal benefit
of information is highest when decisions are centrally made by the principal.
However, the picture changes as we move away from the knife-edge case of a perfectly
predictable profitability ratio η1/η2 = 1. Ex post, the performances of the two divisions may
not be equally profitable/important for the principal, so she only aims to maximize a weighted
sum of the agents’ surplus. Thus, even though the principal values both divisions equally on
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average (i.e., E[η1]/E[η2] = 1), centralization is less valuable for the agents as a commitment
device because of the uncertainty of the global states. Importantly, this negative uncertainty
effect is further amplified by the need for coordination: as the latter increases, a biased principal
gives substantially less consideration to her unfavored agent’s report. This happens because
she primarily wants the more profitable division to adapt more aggressively to its local state
while minimizing the mis-coordination costs.19 Eventually, the positive commitment effect of
centralized decision-making is dominated by the negative effect due to the volatile profitability
of the local markets, leading to an increasing gap in effort provision between decentralization
and centralization.
Part (ii) of Theorem 1 establishes that a decentralized organization induces more efforts
from the agents if the importance of coordination exceeds some cutoff value δ¯ ≥ 0. One may
wonder whether the converse of this statement also holds, i.e., whether it is the case that a cen-
tralized organization is better in terms of effort provision whenever coordination is sufficiently
unimportant. Note that this question is only meaningful if δ¯ 6= 0. In the next subsection,
we show that the lower bound δ¯ = 0 can indeed be achieved by some distributions, imply-
ing that in those cases decentralization outperforms centralization in terms of effort provision
whenever coordination is of any importance. Nevertheless, as we will also show by example
in the next subsection, when the cut-off is strictly positive it is not necessarily the case that
ed < ecF ∀δ ∈ (0, δ¯). In particular, while for intermediate values of δ centralization may indeed
outperform decentralization in terms of effort provision, it may fail to do so when the need for
coordination is relatively small. The next result shows that this is likely to happen when the
profitability conditions of the local markets are very volatile.
Theorem 2. If E
[
1
λ2
]
> E
[
2
λ(1−λ)
]
− 3, then ∃ δ ∈ (0,+∞], such that ed > ecF ∀δ ∈ (0, δ).
To understand Theorem 2, note that its condition is violated if corr(η1, η2) = 1, as this
implies that Pr(λ = 0.5) = 1. By continuity, it must also be violated if η1 and η2 are sufficiently
positively correlated, meaning that the principal is unlikely to strongly bias her decisions in
favor of the more profitable division ex post. As the profitability conditions become less and
less positively correlated, the strategic weights η1 and η2 that the principal assigns to the two
divisions are more likely to be extreme (i.e, λ is more likely to take values that are close to 0
and 1). This makes the condition of Theorem 2 more likely to be satisfied.20 Thus, Theorem 2
19To formalize this intuition, let w = ηiηi+ηi ·
(
ηj
ηi+ηj
+ δ
)/(
ηi
ηi+ηj
· ηjηi+ηj + δ
)
be the strategic weight that
the principal would assign to agent i’s private information when making decision yi under centralization (see
Proposition 4). It can be shown that ∂w∂ηi > 0 and
∂2w
∂ηi∂δ
> 0 ∀δ > 0 and ∀η1, η2 ∈
[
η, η¯
]
, i.e., the principal’s
decision weights will respond more aggressively to the profitability conditions of the local markets as the need
for coordination increases.
20While both E[ 1λ2 ] and E
[
2
λ(1−λ)
]
may increase if the distribution of λ puts more weight toward to endpoints
of the interval [0, 1], the first term increases much faster because of its quadratic form.
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captures the intuition that if the principal is likely to be highly biased ex post, then centralizing
the decision rights can strongly discourage the agents from acquiring valuable information
even when the motive of coordination is small. Therefore, the scope for decentralization to
outperform centralization in effort provision is larger when the profitability conditions of the
local markets are more volatile.
4.1.1 Binary distributions: characterizations
In this section, we use a class of binary distributions {Fω}ω∈[0,1) to illustrate our main findings
regarding the effect of decision right allocation on effort provision: for every ω ∈ [0, 1) the
distribution Fω is characterized by
Pr (η1 = 1 + ω, η2 = 1− ω) = Pr (η1 = 1− ω, η2 = 1 + ω) = 1
2
. (4.2)
Thus, ω can be interpreted as a measure of both the volatility of the local markets’ profitability
conditions and the ex post bias of the principal: the larger ω, the more volatile are the local
markets (since E[(ηi−E[ηi])2] = ω2 and Cov(η1, η2) = −ω2) and the more biased is the principal
ex post (as |(ηi − ηj)/(ηi + ηj)| = ω).
For the above class of binary distributions, we fully characterize when a decentralized
organization outperforms its centralized counterpart in providing incentives to the agents for
exerting costly yet valuable effort. Fixing the volatility of the profitability conditions, or the
degree of the principal’s ex post bias, the next result shows how this regime is shaped by the
importance of promoting synergies in the organization.
Proposition 5. Consider any binary distribution Fω with ω ∈ [0, 1).
(i) If ω ≤ √2− 1, then ed > ecF if and only if δ ∈ (0,max{0, δ(ω)}) ∪ (δ¯(ω),+∞), where
δ(ω) ≡ −ω
4 + 4ω2 − 1
8ω2
− (1 + ω
2)
√
ω4 − 6ω2 + 1
8ω2
,
and
δ¯(ω) ≡ −ω
4 + 4ω2 − 1
8ω2
+
(1 + ω2)
√
ω4 − 6ω2 + 1
8ω2
,
with δ(ω) = 0 if and only if ω ≤
√
2
√
3
3
− 1 ≈ 0.393, and limω→0 δ¯(ω) = +∞.
(ii) If ω >
√
2− 1, then ed > ecF ∀δ > 0.
Figure 2 provides an illustration of Proposition 5 as well as the key messages of Theorems
1 and 2. For the benchmark case of no uncertainty in the profitability conditions (ω = 0),
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0 δ
ed − ecF
(a) ω = 0: δ(ω) = 0, δ¯(ω) = +∞.
0 δ
ed − ecF
(b) ω = 0.2: δ(ω) = 0, δ¯(ω) > 0.
0 δ
ed − ecF
(c) ω = 0.41: δ(ω) > 0, δ¯(ω) > 0.
0 δ
ed − ecF
(d) ω = 0.45: δ(ω) = +∞, δ¯(ω) = 0.
Figure 2: The dependence of effort difference on δ, with c(e) = e2.
Figure 1(a) shows that the agents always work harder under centralization (ed− ecF < 0). This
illustrates Theorem 1(i) and the asymptotic result limω→0 δ¯(ω) = +∞ from Proposition 5(i).
As we start introducing uncertainty to the profitability conditions (η1, η2), both Theorem 1(ii)
and Proposition 5(i) suggest that a decentralized authority structure is superior in guaranteeing
effort provision (and thus also in information production) whenever the need for coordination
is sufficiently strong. Figure 2(b) demonstrates that a strong coordination motive is also
necessary for the equilibrium effort level to be higher under decentralization if the uncertainty
of profitability conditions is sufficiently small. If the degree of uncertainty takes an intermediate
value, then additionally we have ed > ecF when coordination is sufficiently unimportant relative
to adaptation (δ < δ(ω)). As depicted in Figure 2(c), in this case centralizing the decision
rights improves the effort provision if and only if the need for coordination is also intermediate.
This echoes the finding of Theorem 2.21 Finally, when the degree of uncertainty becomes
sufficiently large (ω >
√
2− 1), the agents anticipate that the principal will be heavily biased
when making decisions. This substantially impairs the marginal benefit of information under
centralization from the agents’ perspectives. Proposition 5(ii) and Figure 2(d) show that in
such scenarios decentralization is optimal for guaranteeing effort provision regardless of the
importance of coordination.
21With the binary distributions (4.2), it can be verified that the inequality condition in Theorem 2 is
equivalent to ω > ((2
√
3 )/3− 1)1/2, which is also necessary and sufficient for the cutoff δ(ω) in Proposition 5
to be strictly positive.
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0ed < ecF
ed > ecF
δ
ωˆ(δ)
ω
1
Figure 3: The cutoff ωˆ(δ) and the regimes for ed > ecF and ed < eFc .
To further sharpen our understanding of the effort provision under both organizational
forms we next fix the degree of the coordination requirement and ask, how does the effort
provision depend on the volatility of the profitability conditions? As one may already expect,
the equilibrium effort level is higher under decentralization if and only if the profitability
conditions are sufficiently volatile (i.e., ω is sufficiently large). Perhaps less intuitively, the range
of the volatility parameter ω for which decentralization provides more powerful incentives (i.e.
the set {ω ∈ (0, 1) : ed > ecF}) does not change monotonically with respect to the coordination
motives. Starting with a situation where coordination is of little (large) importance, an increase
in the need for coordination makes it more likely that the agents exert more effort under
centralization (decentralization). These observations are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 6. Given a binary distribution Fω with ω ∈ (0, 1) and δ > 0, ed > ecF if and only
if ω > ωˆ(δ), where
ωˆ(δ) =
√
(4δ + 2)
√
4δ2 + 4δ + 3− 2δ − 3
4δ + 3
− 2δ.
The cutoff ωˆ(δ) is strictly increasing on
(
0,
√
2−1
2
)
, and it is strictly decreasing on
(√
2−1
2
,+∞
)
,
with ωˆ
(√
2−1
2
)
=
√
2− 1 and limδ→+∞ ωˆ(δ) = 0.
The insight of Proposition 6 is further highlighted in Figure 3, where the hatched area
indicates the regime of parameters for which the equilibrium effort level is higher under decen-
tralization. Notably, this graphic representation does not require any specification of the effort
cost function. This shows the generality and robustness of the qualitative results that we have
obtained so far.
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4.2 The principal’s payoff
In this section, we turn to the question of when the principal can benefit from centralization
(decentralization). The immediate implication of the full-revelation results (Propositions 1 and
3) is that centralization is optimal for the principal whenever it can better motivate the agents
than decentralization (ed < ecF ), since this allows her to adjust the relevant organizational
activities to better support the (ex post) more profitable division without sacrificing the (ex
ante) informativeness of the decisions. As suggested by the characterization results Propositions
5 and 6, the principal is more likely to confront such a straightforward comparison between
organizational forms when the need for coordination is small or intermediate and the local
markets are not too volatile.
However, in the previous section we have also shown that the agents’ incentives for informa-
tion gathering are lower under centralization whenever the need for coordination is sufficiently
large and/or the local markets are sufficiently volatile in their profitability conditions. If the
disadvantage of centralization in motivating information gathering is substantial enough, hav-
ing the flexibility to adapt decisions to the actual profitability conditions may not be so valuable
for the principal after all.22 The next result provides a sufficient condition under which the gap
in effort provision between centralization and decentralization is large enough for the principal
to prefer the latter. Specifically, we show that decentralization will outperform centralization
in terms of the principal’s expected payoff provided the effort cost function is not too convex
and coordination is sufficiently important.
Theorem 3. Suppose that corr(η1, η2) < 1. There exists ζ > 0, such that if c′′(e) · e < ζ
∀e ∈ [0, 1], then we have ΠcP < ΠdP for sufficiently large δ.
To understand the above theorem, consider again an individual agent who is deciding on
how much effort to invest in the task of information acquisition. As Theorem 1 shows, if the
local markets exhibit any uncertainty in their relative profitability (corr(η1, η2) < 1) and coor-
dination is sufficiently important, the marginal benefit of effort is higher when decision rights
are allocated to the agents. The gap in the marginal benefits of effort between centralization
and decentralization then translates into a gap in effort provision. Intuitively, this gap in
effort provision will be larger if the derivative c′ does not increase very fast, because the equi-
librium effort levels are chosen to balance the corresponding marginal benefits and marginal
costs. Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration of this intuition: Consider two cost functions
c(e) = e2 and cˆ(e) = e1.5. The marginal cost is arguably increasing faster (on average) in the
22This argument can be best understood by considering the extreme case where both agents exert very
little effort under centralization: given the poor quality of information, the principal often have to take the
uninformed decisions (yi = yj = E[θi]). Thus, the option of tailoring decisions to (η1, η2) is not quite useful.
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Figure 4: Differences in equilibrium effort levels with c(e) = e2 and cˆ(e) = e1.5.
former case than in the latter (since E[c′′(e)] > E[cˆ′′(e)]). As we can see from the figure, for
given marginal benefits of effort under centralization (MBc) and decentralization (MBd) with
MBd −MBc > 0, the gap in effort provision is larger when the cost function is cˆ than when it
is c (i.e., eˆd − eˆcF > ed − ecF ). In fact, in this case, the argument eˆd − eˆcF > ed − ecF also follows
from the observation that the marginal cost function cˆ′(e) is a concave transformation of c′(e).
More generally, if the cost function takes the form c(e) = keα, where k > 0 and α > 1, then
the “sufficiently small ζ” condition in Theorem 3 can be replaced by the requirement that the
power parameter α is sufficiently close to one - in other words, the marginal cost function is
sufficiently concave.23 However, the proof of Theorem 3 shows that what is crucial is not the
concavity of the marginal cost function, but rather the bound of speed at which it grows.
We close this section with a result that parallels Theorem 2: if the profitability conditions
of the local markets are sufficiently volatile and the cost function is not too convex, then, even
when the need of coordination is relatively small, the resulting gap in effort provision can be
substantial enough to make decentralization optimal for the principal.
Theorem 4. Suppose that E
[
1
λ2
]
> E
[
2
λ(1−λ)
]
− 3. For sufficiently small δ > 0, there exists
ζ(δ) > 0, such that if c′′(e) · e < ζ(δ) ∀e ∈ [0, 1], then ΠcP < ΠdP .
Unlike the uniform cutoff ζ in Theorem 3, the cutoff ζ(δ) in Theorem 4 is δ-specific. From
a technical point of view, this is because regardless of the distribution of the global states, the
expected payoffs of the principal under both authority structures (i.e., ΠcP and ΠdP ) converge
to each other as δ goes to zero. A deeper insight we can gain from this exercise is that the
optimal authority structure is more ambiguous when coordination is not so important and
23In fact, one can show that with the cost function c(e) = keα, there exists a cutoff α∗ > 1, such that the
conclusion of Theorem 3 holds if and only if α ≤ α∗ (See Figure 5 for further illustration). More generally and
similar to Theorem 3, if information cost is sufficiently convex, the motivational advantage of decentralization
need not make it optimal for the principal even when coordination is extremely important.
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ω = 0.45
ω = 0.3
0 δ
ΠdP − ΠcP
(a) c(e) = e2, qσ2θ = 1.25.
0 δ
ΠdP − ΠcP
ω = 0.45
ω = 0.3
(b) c(e) = e1.25, qσ2θ = 1.25.
Figure 5: The principal’s payoff and cost functions with different degrees of convexity.
the local markets are highly volatile in their profitability conditions. In such cases, while
decentralization can lead to more motivated agents (see Theorem 2 and Proposition 5), given
the large uncertainty in relative market profitability the principal would also find the power of
making contingent decisions especially valuable.
4.2.1 Binary distributions: examples
To sharpen our understanding on the role of the convexity of the cost function in determin-
ing the relative expected payoff of the principal under centralization and decentralization, we
consider again the class of binary distributions {Fω}ω∈[0,1) introduced in Section 4.1.1. Note
that assuming general cost functions makes it difficult to obtain characterization results that
parallel Propositions 5 and 6. Thus, we look at particular cost functions and specify the degree
of market volatility (ω) to illustrate how the principal’s optimal organizational form depends
on the coordination requirement.
Consider two cost functions, c(e) = e2 and c(e) = e1.25, and two situations of volatility,
ω = 0.3 and ω = 0.45. The choices of ω are meant to be representative. According to
Proposition 5, for ω = 0.3 the agents exert higher effort under decentralization if and only if
coordination is sufficiently important. In contrast, for ω = 0.45 decentralization outperforms
centralization for any degree of the coordination requirement.
In Figure 5(a), we let the cost function be c(e) = e2. For both cases ω = 0.3 and ω =
0.45, the principal’s expected payoff is always higher under centralization independent of the
coordination parameter δ. Thus, with the quadratic cost function, the negative uncertainty
effect of centralization on effort provision is not too severe a concern from the principal’s
perspective. Thus, centralization dominates decentralization by its advantage of allowing the
principal to tailor the organizational activities to the actual profitability conditions across
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markets. Moreover, as Figure 5(a) shows, the value of such flexibility in decision-making is
particularly high for the principal when the volatility of the profitability conditions is large.
In the figure, the dashed curve lies strictly below the non-dashed one, meaning that regardless
of the importance of coordination the payoff difference ΠdP −Πcd is more negative for ω = 0.45
compared to ω = 0.3.
The pattern that centralization is relatively more attractive to the principal when the volatil-
ity/bias measure ω is larger is shared by Figure 5(b), where we use a less convex cost function
c(e) = e1.25. However, unlike in the previous case, here the negative effect of centralization on
effort provision is amplified sufficiently by the need for coordination. In both cases ω = 0.3
and ω = 0.45, as the coordination parameter δ increases, the difference in effort provision (and
thus also in the quality of information) eventually becomes so large that the principal have to
take the uninformed decisions much more often under centralization. Hence, confirming the
finding of Theorem 3, when the effort cost is not too convex and the need for coordination is
sufficiently large the principal is worse off by having the decisions centrally made.
5 Extensions
5.1 Introducing transfers
In this section, we discuss some general implications of introducing transfers for the optimal
choice of organizational structure. We focus on two prominent types of conditional transfers:
pay for performance and pay for information.
So far, we have assumed that the agents care only about their own performance. This can
be interpreted as that an agent only get paid based on the performance of his own division.
However, as Athey and Roberts (2001) and Rantakari (2013) point out, due to informational
externalities the organization designer may want to align the incentives of the managerial
members by tying their compensation to each other’s performance. Indeed, while in extreme
cases an interdependent pay structure may discourage information acquisition (e.g., if agent i’s
reward is primarily determined by j’s performance), an appropriate level of interdependence
can lead to a more efficient use of information (from the principal’s perspective) when decision
rights are decentralized to the divisions. Under centralization, however, there is no room for
such improvement given that a central manager can elicit all information from the local ones for
free. The implication of this analysis is that decentralized decision-making is even more likely
to be optimal when performance-based transfers are available, echoing Milgrom and Roberts
(1992)’s view that the alignment of incentives is complementary to the delegation of authority.
Since the central trade-off of our model comes from strategic information acquisition rather
than strategic communication, one may also envision improving the organization’s performance
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by directly rewarding information collection. Formally, suppose that the principal can commit
to pay a fixed bonus b ≥ 0 to an agent provided that he credibly discloses that his information
experiment is successful (si 6= ∅). In general, allowing for such information-based transfers will
make centralization more likely to be optimal. This is because, other things equal, an additional
unit effort of an agent will be more valuable for the principal when she can decide how to use
the resulting information. Thus, in contrast to performance-based transfers, information-based
transfers are complimentary to centralization. However, it is worth to note that ex ante it may
be optimal for the principal not to provide any direct rewards for information collection (i.e.,
b∗ = 0). For instance, under centralization, implementing an effort level e˜ > ecF would require
the principal to set b = c′(e˜) −MBc > 0, where MBc is an agent’s marginal benefits of effort
under centralization (see Section 4.1). Compared to the case where b = 0, this yields a higher
expected payoff for the principal if and only if
[ΠcP (e˜, e˜)− 2 · (c′(e˜)−MBc) · e˜]− ΠcP (ecF , ecF ) > 0, (5.1)
where ΠcP (e, e) is the principal’s expected payoff under centralization when both agents choose
the effort level e (see Appendix A.8). It is straightforward to check that
ΠcP (e˜, e˜)− ΠcP (ecF , ecF ) = ΞF · (e˜− ecF ),
where
ΞF = 2 ·
E[ηi]− E
δ2 · η1η2η1+η2 + δ · η21η22(η1+η2)3(
η1η2
(η1+η2)2
+ δ
)2

 · σ2θ .
Thus, other things equal, (5.1) is more likely to be violated if the term ΞF is small or if c′(e˜)
is large. In particular, if ΞF is sufficiently small, then (5.1) will not hold for any e˜ > ecF .24 In
those cases, it would be optimal for the principal to choose b = 0 under centralization.
5.2 Costly exaggeration
In the previous sections, the communication stages under both centralization and decentral-
ization have been modeled as a game with verifiable information: an agent can always send
a certified message and reveal the finding of his information acquisition experiment to the
receiving party. The crucial implication of this assumption is that in our model, the funda-
mental difference between centralization and decentralization is not the endogenous quality of
communication - in both cases the messages communicated by agents will be truthful and fully
24To see this, note that the first derivative of the LHS of (5.1) with respect to e˜ is negative for all e˜ > ecF if
ΞF is sufficiently small.
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informative - but rather the quality of information, which is endogenously determined by the
effort of the agents.
The verifiability assumption is intended to capture situations where the decision-relevant
information held by organizational agents is in the form of hard evidence, or at least it can
be supported by objective measures. For instance, a division manager may conduct marketing
research with statistical analysis to convey information about the consumer demand of his
responsible market. However, there are certainly settings where one may view the assumption
of perfect verifiability restrictive. For example, when a specialized manager provides marketing
research showing that the consumer demand is high, others in the organization may not be able
to tell for sure whether the conclusion is driven by a deliberate (and possibly biased) choice of
statistical methods of analysis. If the manager wants to exaggerate the consumer demand by
manipulating his data, the imperfect verifiability of information can be problematic because it
seems conceivable that an exaggerated report may not be caught by his colleagues, especially
when it is not too far away from the truth. In what follows, we will show that the insights from
our full revelation results are robust provided that such exaggeration is not entirely costless.
Specifically, suppose that Θ = R, and when communicating (either with the principal or
with each other) the agents are allowed to send any message mi ∈ M = R ∪ {∅}, irrespective
of the true findings of their experiments. However, given the true signal is si ∈ S = R ∪ {∅},
sending a message mi ∈M = R ∪ {∅} will incur a non-negative cost z(mi, si) to agent i. This
communication game converges to one with verifiable disclosure when the function z satisfies
z(m, s) = 0 if m ∈ {s, ∅}, and z(m, s) = +∞ otherwise. We now consider general cases which
only require the following less restrictive assumption on the communication cost function z:
(A2) Function z :M×S → R+ ∪ {+∞} satisfies
(i) z(s, s) = 0 ∀s ∈ S, and
(ii) z(m, s) = κ(m− s)2 if either m > s > 0 or m < s < 0, where κ > 0.
In words, condition (i) states that telling the truth is always costless. However, as condition
(ii) states, it is costly for the agents to exaggerate their findings. In particular, the further
away an agent’s message is from the truth, the more costly it is to send such a message. It
may be natural to further assume that z(m, s) = 0 if 0 ≤ m < s, s < m ≤ 0 or m = ∅ (i.e.,
understating or concealing one’s finding is also costless), and z(m, s) = +∞ if m · s < 0 (i.e.,
lying about the sign of the local state is never feasible). One may also want to extend condition
(ii) to the case where s ∈ {0, ∅}. None of these additional assumptions will be necessary for
our analysis in this section.
Although assumption (A2) rules out pure cheap talk communication, it still provides arbi-
trarily rich possibilities to lie (under consideration of lying costs). The next proposition states
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that despite the non-verifiability of agents’ private information, provided that (A2) is satisfied
the endogenous quality of communication under both centralization and decentralization will
be identical and maximal: just as in the main model, in either case a fully revealing equilibrium
exists.
Proposition 7. Suppose that the communication cost satisfies (A2).
(i) Under decentralization, there exists a fully revealing PBE in which
mˇdi (ei, si) =
tdsi if si ∈ R∅ if si = ∅ , ∀ei ∈ [0, 1], and ∀i = 1, 2,
where td = 1
2
+
√
qδ2
κ(1+2δ)2
+ 1
4
. In equilibrium, both agents exert the same effort
eˇd ≡ (c′)−1
((
1− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
qσ2θ − κ(td − 1)2σ2θ
)
.
(ii) Under centralization, there exists a fully revealing PBE in which
mˇci(ei, si) =
tcsi if si ∈ R∅ if si = ∅ , ∀ei ∈ [0, 1], and ∀i = 1, 2,
where tc = 1
2
+
√
E
[
qλ(1−λ)[2δ2+δ(λ2+(1−λ)2)]
2κ(λ(1−λ)+δ)2
]
+ 1
4
, and λ = η1/(η1 + η2). In equilibrium,
both agents exert the same effort
eˇcF ≡ (c′)−1
((
1− Eλ
[
δ2(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2δλ2(1− λ)2
2 (λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ − κ (tc − 1)2 σ2θ
)
.
Proposition 7 shows that in equilibrium, the agents “lie” in such a way that their private
signals can be perfectly inferred from the messages communicated. To relate it to our pre-
vious results in Section 3 (Propositions 1 - 4), note that as κ → +∞, both coefficients td
and tc converge to 1. In addition, the total expected communication costs κ(td − 1)2 and
κ(tc − 1)2 converge to zero. This implies that as exaggeration becomes infinitely costly, un-
der both centralization and decentralization the agents simply disclose their acquired signals
(mdi (ei, si),mci(ei, si) → si ∀si ∈ R ∪ {∅}) and exert the same amount of effort as in the main
model (eˇd → ed, eˇcF → ecF ).
Perhaps a more interesting observation is that the equilibria under both centralization and
decentralization feature language inflation (tc, td > 1). This is reminiscent of the findings of
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Kartik et al. (2007) and Kartik (2009) on strategic communication with credulous receivers
or with exogenous lying costs. Compared to the existing papers, a novelty of our language
inflation results is that they hold in settings that feature either bilateral communication (in
the case of decentralization) or competing senders with differentiated private information (in
the case of centralization).25
6 Related Literature
The organizational problem of coordinated adaptation under dispersed information has a long
intellectual history in organizational theory and economics (see, among many others, Barnard,
1938; Cyert and March, 1963; Simon, 1947; Williamson, 1975, 1996). Our paper belongs to
a growing strand of this literature, which examines how an organization’s decision-making
structure can determine its ability to coordinate the activities of its sub-units while remaining
responsive to changes in the local environments. Specifically, our model builds on the frame-
work developed by Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008), which are among the first papers
to model strategic information transmission in the context of designing multi-divisional orga-
nizations. They focus on the case where information is “soft”, meaning that communication
between organizational members takes the form of cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel, 1982).
One of their most insightful findings is that as the need for coordination increases, the commu-
nication of decision-relevant information under centralization (decentralization) becomes less
(more) informative. This implies that the comparative advantage of an authority structure
need not be monotone in the importance of coordination (Rantakari, 2008). In addition, if
the interests of the local managers are sufficiently aligned, then the optimality of decentralized
decision-making is not necessarily inconsistent with a large need for coordination (Alonso et al.,
2008).26 Our model departs from theirs mainly by (1) focusing on the case where information
is “hard” (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981) or at least is costly to misrepresent (Kartik, 2009;
Kartik et al., 2007), and (2) relaxing the (implicit) assumption that the local markets where the
organization operates exhibit no uncertainty in their profitability conditions. More important
than the modeling differences, we add to Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008, 2013), and
more generally to the literature of organizational design and coordinated adaptation, by show-
ing that the importance of coordination can even make decentralized decision-making optimal.
In particular, this result holds despite the fact that in our model the allocation of decision
25Emons and Fluet (2012) were the first to show that the feature of language information can also arise in
a setting with multiple senders. However, the senders in their model (plaintiff and defendant) have perfectly
correlated types (they share the private knowledge about the amount of damages). This is not the case in our
model because the private types θi and θj are independently distributed.
26While both Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008) assume that the private information of the managers
is exogenous, their main results are subsequently shown to be robust to endogenous information acquisition
(Rantakari, 2013). Their models have also been extended to more than two divisions (Yang and Zhang, 2017).
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rights does not affect the informativeness of communication at all, and that the conflicts of
interests between the local managers are maximal (as they only care about their own divisions).
Within the literature on organizational design and coordinated adaptation, our paper is
further related to Dessein et al. (2010), Friebel and Raith (2010), and Alonso et al. (2015). In
Dessein et al. (2010), the organization can better exploit the benefits of cost-saving standard-
ization by integrating its manufacturing activities. Standardization, however, also comes with
a loss in revenues because it impedes the organization’s ability to tailor its marketing activities
to local conditions. Dessein et al. (2010) find that a more decentralized authority structure can
better incentivize the managerial members of the organization to exert division-specific effort,
but it is still dominated by a more centralized one if the expected value of synergies (akin to the
importance of coordination in our model) is sufficiently large. Thus, unlike in our paper, the
advantage of decentralized decision-making in incentivizing effort provision is thwarted rather
than strengthened by the importance of coordinating activities across organizational units.
In line with Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008), both Friebel and Raith (2010)
and Alonso et al. (2015) consider settings where the top management of the organization is
constrained (and often also harmed) by its informational disadvantage compared to the division
managers. In Friebel and Raith (2010), delegating resource-allocating rights to the division
managers can be optimal since they control the information about the marginal return of their
projects. But delegation can also be sub-optimal because sometimes it is more profitable to
concentrate all resources on a single project. In Alonso et al. (2015), the headquarter may be
better off by letting the division managers choose their production plans independently given
that they know more about the demand conditions of each market, but the opposite may also
occur since the costs of production are interdependent. Nevertheless, if the division managers
were non-strategic in communication, then both the models of Friebel and Raith (2010) and
Alonso et al. (2015) would conclude that it is always optimal to have the decisions centrally
made. In contrast, in our model, even without the help of message-contingent transfers, the
division managers are always incentivized to be truthful when communicating their private
information to the decision-making parties.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on delegation as an instrument to motivate infor-
mation acquisition. The seminal work of Aghion and Tirole (1997) introduces an important
trade-off between employee initiative and the loss of control. In their framework, an agent has
to acquire decision-relevant information and has better incentives to do so when being able
to formally control the decision. With multiple agents and partial coordination motives, the
ability of an agent to influence the decisions is restricted by the optimal behavior of the other
agents. In fact, in our multi-agent setting, absent the uncertainty in the principal’s (interim)
decision rule, the agents’ incentives for information acquisition are always weaker under del-
egation (Theorem 1(i)). Nevertheless, we show that this pessimistic view of delegation need
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not hold once some uncertainty over the principal’s decision rule is introduced (Theorems 1(ii)
and 2). Thus, the driving force of the motivational advantage of delegation in our model is
different from that in Aghion and Tirole (1997).
More recent contributions show that the incentive effect of delegation can be ambiguous if
the communication between the principal and the agent is strategic.27 For example, in Argen-
ziano, Severinov, and Squintani (2016), the principal can benefit from retaining the decision-
making authority while delegating the task of information acquisition to the agent. This is
because the principal may either threaten the agent with a babbling off-path if information
gathering is overt, or obstinately expect the information to be highly precise if it is acquired
covertly. The finding that centralizing the authority to the principal can better motivate the
agent to acquire information compared to delegation is shared by Che and Kartik (2009). A
key driving force of their result is that the principal and the agent hold different priors about
the state of nature (“opinions”), so under centralization whenever the latter fails to provide
any evidence the former would make an adverse inference and take an unfavorable action.28
All papers above focus on settings with a single agent, whereas ours feature multiple ones.29
This modeling difference is not superfluous. As we show, the incentive effect of delegation
(decentralization) crucially depends on the interaction between the need for coordinating the
agents’ actions and how their relative performance is valued by the principal.
7 Conclusion
When operating in multiple markets which exhibit uncertainty in their relative profitability,
how should an organization optimally allocate decision-making authority to its managerial
members? In this paper we addressed this question in a model where decision-relevant infor-
mation is collected and transmitted by strategic and self-interested division managers, and the
objective of the organization is to solve the problem of coordinated adaptation.
Our paper makes two main contributions. The first is that if information is verifiable
or if lying is not costless, then the quality of communication is not affected by where the
decision-making authority is lodged in the organization. Moreover, since the principal of the
27Abstracting from strategic communication, the incentive view of delegation is also discussed by Rantakari
(2012). He shows that formal delegation is unlikely to be optimal when the quality of implementable projects
is determined by both the principal’s and the agent’s effort choices. The reason is that an unconstrained agent
would only be interested in improving the private return of his project. In contrast, under centralization, for
his project to be implemented the agent would also need to make it sufficiently attractive to the principal.
28A similar persuasive motive of information acquisition under centralization is also present in Newman and
Novoselov (2009). In their setting, the principal and the agent share a common prior about the state of nature,
but they differ in the costs of committing different types of statistical errors.
29Kartik, Lee, and Suen (2017) show that if the principal cannot commit to decision rules ex ante, then
having multiple agents compete with each other does not necessarily encourage information acquisition. In
their setting, the efforts of the agents are (endogenously) strategic substitutes, whereas in ours, the equilibrium
effort choices are strategically independent (see Propositions 2 and 4).
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organization can elicit all private information from its local delegates, the fact that the princi-
pal is not well informed per se does not make centralized decision-making inferior. However, as
a second contribution, we show that the quality of endogenously acquired information depends
crucially on the allocation of decision rights. In particular, if the local markets exhibit any
uncertainty in their relative profitability, a large coordination motive can strongly discourage
information gathering under centralization, which in turn makes decentralized decision-making
optimal. Yet it is also worth noting that when the need for coordination is small or interme-
diate, centralized decision-making is often optimal because it allows the organization to better
cope with inter-market uncertainty, while not necessarily making the division managers less
motivated. Overall, our results call for a more careful examination of the Delegation Principle,
which is well-known in the management literature (see, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) and
emphasizes that “the power to make decisions should reside in the hands of those with relevant
information” (Krishna and Morgan, 2008, p. 905).
We suggest two venues for future research. First, given that the communication of decision-
relevant information in organizations is often not entirely cheap talk (e.g., marketing reports
must contain survey evidence or data analysis in order to be taken serious, lying to colleagues
may result in retaliation or even being fired), it is worth reconsidering how essential the infor-
mational constraints are in various organizational design problems. A conjecture based on the
analysis of our paper is that in settings with verifiable information, the incentive constraints
for communication can be much less important than the physical or technological ones (Aoki,
1986; Dessein and Santos, 2006). Second, when the uncertainty in the profitability of different
product markets is substantial, the principal of the organization may prefer a more moderate
way to mitigate her commitment problem than unconditionally delegating the decisions to the
division managers. It is an open question whether the principal can benefit from conditional
delegation, e.g., committing to only execute her authority when it is reported that the local
states take extreme values.
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A Proofs of Main Results
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Part (i) First, consider agent i’s incentives in the decision-making stage. Taking (ei, si,mi,mj)
as given, in the decision-making stage agent i solves:
max
yi∈R
q
(
K − E [(yi − θi)2 |si]− δE [(yi − ydj (ej, sj,mi,mj))2|mi,mj]) .
Sequential rationality then implies that agent i’s should take the following action:
yi =
E [θi|si] + δE
[
ydj (ej, sj,mi,mj)|mi,mj
]
1 + δ
.
Note that the best response of the agent does not depend on his sunk effort ei. From now
on, we drop (ei, ej) from the functions (ydi , ydj ) as they play no role. Solving the best response
functions through repeated substitution, we obtain the following decision rules which must be
satisfied in any equilibrium:
ydi (si,mi,mj) =
E [θi|si]
1 + δ
+
δ2E[θi|mi]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
+
δE[θj|mj]
1 + 2δ
, ∀i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (A.1)
where the conditional expectations E[θi|si] and E[θj|mj] (E[θj|sj] and E[θi|mi], resp.) are taken
according to the agent i’s (agent j’s, resp.) posterior beliefs about the local states.
Now suppose that agent i anticipates that agent j will exert some arbitrary effort ej ∈ [0, 1],
communicate his finding truthfully according to the strategy mdj specified in the proposition,
and choose his action according to the mapping ydj specified in (A.1). Taking the the sequen-
tially rational decision rule ydi as given, we consider agent i’s incentive in the communication
stage. Since by construction (mdi ,mdj ) are effort-independent, we drop the variables (ei, ej)
from them. To ease notation, we also assume without loss of generality that msi = si ∀si ∈ Θ.
Let si ∈ S be the signal received by agent i. For any message mi ∈M(si), we have
ELda(si,mi) =Esj
[
E
[(
ydi (si,mi,m
d
j (sj))− θi
)2 ∣∣∣si]]
=Esj
E
(E[θi|si]
1 + δ
+
δ2E[θi|mi]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
+
δE[θj|mdj (sj)]
1 + 2δ
− θi
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si

=E
[(
E[θi|si]
1 + δ
+
δ2E[θi|mi]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
− θi
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si
]
+ Esj
[(
δE[θj|sj]
1 + 2δ
)2]
, (A.2)
where the last equality follows that Esj [E[θj|sj]] = E[θj] = 0.
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Similarly, for the expected loss of mis-coordination resulted by any message mi, we have
ELdc(si,mi)
=Esj
[
E[(ydi (si,mi,mdj (sj))− ydj (sj,mi,mdj (sj)))2|si]
]
= Esj
E
(E[θi|si]
1 + δ
− δE[θi|mi]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
− E[θj|sj]
1 + δ
+
δE[θj|mdj (sj)]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣sj

=E
[(
E[θi|si]
1 + δ
− δE[θi|mi]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si
]
+ Esj
[(
E[θj|sj]
1 + δ
− δE[θj|sj]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2]
=E
[(
(1 + δ)E[θi|si] + δ(E[θi|si]− E[θi|mi])
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si
]
+ Esj
[(
E [θj|sj]
1 + 2δ
)2]
. (A.3)
Since for every (si,mi) ∈ S ×M(si) the (interim) expected payoff of agent i is given by
Πˆdi (si,mi) = q
(
K − ELda(si,mi)− δELdc(si,mi)
)
,
communicating according to mdi is incentive compatible for agent i if under some consistent
posterior beliefs of agent j, we have
ELda(si, si) ≤ ELda(si,mi) and ELdc(si, si) ≤ ELdc(si,mi), ∀mi ∈M(si),∀si ∈ S. (A.4)
To construct the required posterior beliefs, for everymi ∈M we let agent j assign probabil-
ity one to that agent i’s type is smi ∈ argminsi∈Smi
∣∣E[θi|si]∣∣, i.e., µij({smi |mi}) = 1. If ∅ ∈ Smi ,
the existence of smi is trivial. If ∅ /∈ Smi , the existence of smi is guaranteed by the assumption
that Smi is closed. This is because minsi∈Smi
∣∣E[θi|si]∣∣ = minsi∈Smi∩[−|s′i|, |s′i|] ∣∣E[θi|si]∣∣, where s′i
is any element of Smi , and the set Smi ∩ [−|s′i|, |s′i|] is compact. In addition, by construction
we have ssi = si ∀si ∈ S. Given the constructed beliefs, we have E[θi|∅] = E[θi|mi] = 0
∀mi ∈ M(∅), E[θi|si] = si ≥ E[θi|mi] ∀si ≥ 0 and mi ∈ M(si), and E[θi|si] = si ≤ E[θi|mi]
∀si < 0 and mi ∈M(si). It is then straightforward to check that (A.4) is satisfied.
To complete the construction of a fully revealing PBE, we finally consider the information
acquisition stage. Given the communication strategies (md1,md2), the decision rules (yd1 , yd2), and
any pair of efforts (e1, e2) ∈ E2, agent i’s expected payoff is
Udi (ei, ej)
= q
(
K − (1− ei)
[
(1− ej) + ej
(
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
+ 1
)]
σ2θ
− ei
[
(1− ej)
(
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
+ ej
(
2δ2 + 2δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)]
σ2θ
)
− c(ei)
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= q
(
K − (1− ei)
[
1 + ej
(
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)]
σ2θ − ei(1 + ej)
(
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
σ2θ
)
− c(ei)
= q
(
K −
[
1 + ej
(
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)]
σ2θ + ei
(
1− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
σ2θ
)
− c(ei).
Differentiating with respect to ei, we obtain the following first-order condition:
∂Udi (ei, ej)
∂ei
=
(
1− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
qσ2θ − c′(ei) = 0. (A.5)
When the cost function c is strictly increasing, and satisfies lime→0 c′(e) <
(
1− δ2+δ
(1+2δ)2
)
qσ2θ <
c′(1), (A.5) will admit a unique interior solution edi ∈ (0, 1), which is given by
edi = e
d ≡ (c′)−1
((
1− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
qσ2θ
)
. (A.6)
In addition, when c is strictly convex, the function Udi will be strictly concave in ei, and thus
the solution ei = ed is also the unique global maximizer of Udi (ei, ej), ∀ej ∈ [0, 1]. We have
assumed that the cost function c satisfies all these properties (see Section 2).
Similarly, choosing ej = ed also maximizes the expected payoff of agent j independent of the
effort choice of agent i. We can therefore conclude that, together with the “conservative” beliefs
that we construct above for the agents, the symmetric strategy profile ((ed,md1, yd1), (ed,md2, yd2))
constitutes a fully revealing PBE. 
Part (ii) Let ((e∗1,m∗1, y∗1), (e∗2,m∗2, y∗2)) be an equilibrium strategy profile under decentraliza-
tion. Consider any si ∈ S \ {0, ∅}. Repeating the calculations of (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3), it can
be checked that agent i would strictly prefer the type-revealing message mi = msi than the
proposed equilibrium message m∗i (e∗i , si) if both of the following two inequalities hold:
E
[(
E[θi|si]
1 + δ
+
δ2E[θi|m∗i (e∗i , si)]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
− θi
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si
]
>E
[(
E[θi|si]
1 + δ
+
δ2E[θi|m∗i (e∗i , si)]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
− θi
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si
]
. (A.7)
and
E
[(
(1 + δ)E[θi|si] + δ(E[θi|si]− E[θi|m∗i (e∗i , si)])
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si
]
>E
[(
(1 + δ)E[θi|si] + δ(E[θi|si]− E[θi|msi ])
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si
]
. (A.8)
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Note that for any si 6= ∅, (A.7) is further equivalent to(
δ(1 + δ)si + δ
2(si − E[θi|m∗i (e∗i , si)])
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2
>
(
δ(1 + δ)si + δ
2(si − E[θi|msi ])
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2
. (A.9)
From (A.8) and (A.9), it is clear that if si > 0, then deviating to msi is not profitable for agent
i only if si ≤ E[θi|m∗i (e∗i , si)]. Similarly, if si < 0, then deviating to msi is not profitable for
agent i only if si ≥ E[θi|m∗i (e∗i , si)]. These arguments also imply that we must havem∗i (e∗i , si) 6=
m∗i (e
∗
i , s
′
i) ∀si, s′i ∈ S \ {0, ∅} such that si · s′i < 0.
Next, suppose, in contradiction to Proposition 1(ii), that there exist i ∈ {1, 2} and a non-
null subset Sˆ ⊆ S \ {0, ∅} with respect to Γ, such that µij({sˆi}|m∗i (e∗i , sˆi)) < 1 ∀sˆi ∈ Sˆ.30
Since the beliefs must be consistent in equilibrium, we have m∗i (e∗i , sˆi) 6= msˆi ∀sˆi ∈ Sˆ. For
every on-path equilibrium message mˆ∗i that is sent by some sˆi ∈ Sˆ, define Sˆ(mˆ∗i ) = {si ∈ Sˆ :
m∗i (e
∗
i , si) = mˆ
∗
i }. Let Mˆ
∗
be the set of all such messages mˆ∗i .
We claim that the set Sˆ(mˆ∗i ) is null with respect to Γ for all mˆ∗i ∈ Mˆ
∗
. This is because if
Sˆ(mˆ∗i ) is non-null with respect to Γ for some mˆ∗i , the condition µij({sˆi}|m∗i (e∗i , sˆi)) < 1∀sˆi ∈ Sˆ
would imply that there exists si ∈ Sˆ(mˆ∗i ) such that either si > max{0,E[θi|mˆ∗i ]} or si <
min{0,E[θi|mˆ∗i ]} holds. This is not possible given our analysis of (A.8) and (A.9).
Since Sˆ(mˆ∗i ) is null with respect to Γ for all mˆ∗i ∈ Mˆ
∗
, Bayes’ rule implies that for every
mˆ∗i ∈ Mˆ
∗
there must exist an atom smˆ∗i ∈ S in the distribution Γ, such that m∗i (e∗i , smˆ∗i ) = mˆ∗i
and µij({smˆ∗i }|mˆ∗i ) = 1. Note that by construction, each mˆ∗i ∈ Mˆ
∗
is associated with a different
atom. However, since Sˆ = ∪mˆ∗i Sˆ(mˆ∗i ) is non-null with respect to Γ, the set Mˆ
∗
must be
uncountable, and this would imply that the distribution Γ admits uncountably many atoms.
We thus reach a contradiction. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let ((e∗1,m∗1, y∗1), (e∗2,m∗2, y∗2)) be a fully revealing equilibrium under decentralization. Given
the full revelation, we have E[θi|m∗i (e∗i , si)] = E[θi|si] ∀si ∈ S and ∀i = 1, 2. Then, (A.1)
implies that the on-path equilibrium decision rules are uniquely pinned down by Bayes’ rule
and sequential rationality, and they are the exactly ones given by the proposition. As we have
shown in Proposition 1(i), given the equilibrium decisions are taken according to (yd1(s), yd1(s)),
ed is the unique expected-payoff-maximizing effort level for both agents. Hence, we must have
e∗i = e
d and y∗i (e∗i , si,m∗i (e∗i , si),m∗j(e∗j , sj)) = ydi (si, sj), ∀(si, sj) ∈ S2, i = 1, 2.
30Formally, we say that a set Sˆ ⊆ S is non-null with respect to Γ if ∫S 1{s∈Sˆ}dΓ > 0, and it is null with
respect to Γ if
∫
S 1{s∈Sˆ}dΓ = 0.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i) First, consider the principal’s incentive in the decision-making stage. Taking (m1,m2)
and (η1, η2) as given, in the decision-making stage the principal solves:
max
y1,y2∈R
(η1 + η2)
(
K − δ(y1 − y2)2
)− η1E [(y1 − θ1)2|m1]− η2E [(y2 − θ2)2|m2] .
The first-order conditions imply that at optimum the principal’s actions (y1, y2) must solve the
following system of equations:
− δ(η1 + η2)(y1 − y2)− η1 (y1 − E [θ1|m1]) = 0,
− δ(η1 + η2)(y2 − y1)− η1 (y2 − E [θ2|m2]) = 0.
Solving the above equations, we obtain the following decision rules which must be satisfied in
any equilibrium:
yci (m,η) =
ηi
ηi+ηj
·
(
ηj
ηi+ηj
+ δ
)
E [θi|mi] + δηjηi+ηjE[θj|mj]
ηi
ηi+ηj
· ηj
ηi+ηj
+ δ
∀i = 1, 2, (A.10)
where the conditional expectations E[θi|mi] and E[θj|mj] are taken according to the principal
posterior beliefs about the local states.
Next, we take the above decision rules (yc1, yc2) of the principal as given and consider the
agents’ incentives in the communication stage. We will only verify the equilibrium incentives
of agent 1, as for agent 2 the problem is analogous. Suppose that agent 1 anticipates that
agent 2 will exert some arbitrary effort e2 ∈ [0, 1] and communicate his finding truthfully
according to the strategy mc2 specified in the proposition. Since by construction (mc1,mc2) are
effort-independent, we drop the variables (e1, e2) from them. To ease notation, we also assume
without loss of generality that ms = s ∀s ∈ Θ.
Let s1 ∈ S be the signal received by agent 1. Letting λ = η1/(η1 + η2), for every message
m1 ∈M(s1) and every η ∈
[
η, η¯
]2 we have
ELca(s1,m1,η)
=Es2
[
E
[
(yc1(m1,m
c
2(s2),η)− θ1)2
∣∣∣s1]]
=Es2
[
E
[(
λ (1− λ+ δ)E [θ1|m1] + δ(1− λ)E[θ2|mc2(s2)]
λ(1− λ) + δ − θ1
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣s1
]]
=E
[(
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)E [θ1|m1]
λ(1− λ) + δ − θ1
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣s1
]
+ Es2
[(
δ(1− λ)E[θ2|s2]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2]
, (A.11)
where the last equality follows that Es2 [E[θ2|s2]] = E[θ2] = 0.
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Similarly, for the expected loss of mis-coordination, we have for every m1 ∈ M(s1) and
every η ∈ [ η, η¯ ]2,
ELcc(s1,m1,η) =Es2
[
E[(yc1(m1,mc2(s2),η)− yc2(m1,mc2(s2)))2|s1]
]
= Es2
[(
λ(1− λ)E[θ1|m1]− λ(1− λ)E[θ2|mc2(s2)]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2]
=
(
λ(1− λ)E[θ1|m1]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
+ Es2
[(
λ(1− λ)E[θ2|s2]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2]
. (A.12)
where the last equality follows that Es2 [E[θ2|s2]] = E[θ2] = 0.
Since for every (s1,m1) ∈ S ×M(s1), the interim expected payoff of agent 1 is given by
Πˆci(s1,m1) = Eη [q (K − ELca(s1,m1,η)− δELcc(s1,m1,η))] ,
communicating according to mc1 is incentive compatible for agent 1 if under some consistent
posterior beliefs of the principal, we have
ELca(s1, s1,η) + δEL
c
c(s1, s1,η) ≤ ELca(s1,m1,η) + δELcc(s1,m1,η), (A.13)
for all s1 ∈ S, m1 ∈ M(s1), η ∈
[
η, η¯
]2. We note that after some rearrangement, (A.13) is
equivalent to(
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)E[θ1|∅]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
+ δ
(
λ(1− λ)E[θ1|∅]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
≤
(
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)E[θ1|m1]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
+ δ
(
λ(1− λ)E[θ1|m1]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
(A.14)
if s1 = ∅. If s1 6= ∅, then (A.13) is equivalent to(
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)s1
λ(1− λ) + δ − s1
)2
+ δ
(
λ(1− λ)s1
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
≤
(
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)E[θ1|m1]
λ(1− λ) + δ − s1
)2
+ δ
(
λ(1− λ)E[θ1|m1]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
. (A.15)
Since E[θ1|∅] = 0, (A.14) always holds regardless of the principal’s beliefs. To show (A.15),
we construct the following consistent beliefs for the principal: for every m1 ∈ M we let
the principal assign probability one to that agent 1’s type is sm1 ∈ argmins1∈Sm1
∣∣E[θ1|s1]∣∣,
i.e., µ1p({sm1|m1}) = 1. The existence of sm1 is guaranteed by the assumption that Sm1 is
closed. Also, by construction ss1 = s1 ∀s1 ∈ S. Given the constructed beliefs, we have
E[θ1|∅] = E[θ1|m1] = 0 ∀m1 ∈ M(∅), E[θ1|s1] = si ≥ E[θ1|m1] ∀s1 ≥ 0 and m1 ∈ M(s1), and
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E[θ1|s1] = s1 ≤ E[θ1|m1] ∀s1 < 0 and m1 ∈M(s1).
Next, note that the RHS of (A.15) can be rewritten as the sum of the following two terms:
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 (E[θ1|m1]− s1)
2 +
(1− λ)2δ2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 s
2
1 (A.16)
and
−2δ(1− λ)(λ(1− λ) + δ)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 (E[θ1|m1]− s1) s1 +
δλ2(1− λ)2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2E[θ1|m1]
2. (A.17)
We claim that ∀s1 ∈ Θ, λ ∈ [0, 1] and δ > 0, both of these two terms are minimized when
E[θ1|m1] = s1, which is in turn sufficient for (A.15) to hold for all s1 6= ∅. For the first term
(A.16), this is straightforward. For the second term (A.17), we note that
− 2δ(1− λ)(λ(1− λ) + δ)E[θ1|m1]s1 + δλ2(1− λ)2E[θ1|m1]2
= − δλ(1− λ)2 (2s1 − λE[θ1|m1])E[θ1|m1]− 2δ2(1− λ)E[θ1|m1]s1,
and that the function v(x) = −δλ(1 − λ)2 · (2s1 − λx)x is decreasing in x when x ≤ x¯ and
s1 ≥ 0, and it is increasing if x ≥ s1 and s1 < 0. Hence, given the beliefs we construct for the
principal, (A.17) is also minimized when E[θ1|m1] = s1.
In sum, we have shown that the truthful-telling constraint (A.13) holds for every pair
η ∈ [ η, η¯ ]2. In other words, it is a best response for agent 1 to reveal his type even when
the distribution of η is deterministic. Therefore, the same must also hold for arbitrary non-
deterministic distribution of η.
To complete the construction of a fully revealing PBE, we finally consider the information
acquisition stage. Given the communication strategies (mc1,mc2), the decision rules (yc1, yc2), and
any pair of efforts (e1, e2) ∈ E2, agent 1’s expected payoff is
U c1(e1, e2)
= q
(
K − (1− e1)
(
(1− e2) + e2
(
Eλ
[
(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
]
+ 1
))
σ2θ
− e1
(
(1− e2)Eλ
[
(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
]
+ e2Eλ
[
2(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
σ2θ
)
− c(e1)
= q
(
K −
(
1 + e2Eλ
[
(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
σ2θ
− e1
(
1− Eλ
[
(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
σ2θ
)
− c(e1).
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Differentiating with respect to e1, we obtain the following first-order condition:
∂U c1(e1, e2)
∂e1
=
(
1− Eλ
[
(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ − c′(e1) = 0. (A.18)
When the cost function c is strictly increasing and satisfies
lim
e→0
c′(e) <
(
1− Eλ
[
(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ < c
′(1),
(A.18) will admit a unique interior solution ec1 ∈ (0, 1), which is given by
ec1 = (c
′)−1
((
1− Eλ
[
(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ
)
. (A.19)
In addition, when c is strictly convex, the function U c1 will be strictly concave in e1, and thus
the solution ec1 is also the unique global maximizer of U c1(e1, e2) ∀e2 ∈ [0, 1]. These properties
of the cost function have all been assumed in Section 2.
By analogous arguments, one can show that choosing
ec2 = (c
′)−1
((
1− Eλ
[
λ2 (δ2 + δ(1− λ)2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ
)
will maximize the expected payoff of agent 2 regardless of the effort choice of agent 1. Fur-
ther, since the distribution F is symmetric in its arguments (η1, η2), λ must be symmetrically
distributed around 1/2. Exploiting this symmetry, we obtain
ec1 = e
c
2 = e
c
F ≡ (c′)−1
((
1− Eλ
[
δ2(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2δλ2(1− λ)2
2(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ
)
.
We can now conclude that, together with the degenerate posterior beliefs µip(ei,mi) =
(ecF ,mi) (i.e., the principal assigns probability one to ei = ecF and si = mi) ∀i = 1, 2, the
strategy profile ((ecF ,mc1), (ecF ,mc2), (yc1, yc2)) constitutes a fully revealing PBE. 
Part (ii) Let ((e∗1,m∗1, y∗1), (e∗2,m∗2, y∗2)) be an equilibrium strategy profile under centralization.
Without loss of generality, we focus on agent 1 and consider any s1 ∈ S \{0, ∅}. Repeating the
calculations of (A.10), (A.11) and (A.12), it can be checked that agent 1 would strictly prefer
the type-revealing message m1 = ms1 than the proposed equilibrium message m∗1(e∗1, s1) if both
of the following two inequalities hold:
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 (E[θ1|m
∗
1(e
∗
1, s1)]− s1)2 +
(1− λ)2δ2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 s
2
1
>
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 (E[θ1|m
s1 ]− s1)2 + (1− λ)
2δ2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 s
2
1, (A.20)
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and
− 2δ(1− λ)(λ(1− λ) + δ)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 (E[θ1|m
∗
1(e
∗
1, s1)]− s1) s1 +
δλ2(1− λ)2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2E[θ1|m
∗
1(e
∗
1, s1)]
2
> − 2δ(1− λ)(λ(1− λ) + δ)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 (E[θ1|m
s1 ]− s1) s1 + δλ
2(1− λ)2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2E[θ1|m
s1 ]2. (A.21)
Since |E[θ1|m∗1(e∗1, s1)] − s1| ≥ 0 ∀s1 ∈ S \ {0, ∅}, (A.20) always holds. In addition, similar to
what we have shown for (A.17), (A.21) will also hold if E[θ1|ms1 ] = s1 > max{E[θ1|m∗1(e∗1, s1)], 0}
or E[θ1|ms1 ] = s1 < min{E[θ1|m∗1(e∗1, s1)], 0}. Hence, for the proposed strategy profile to
constitute an equilibrium, it is necessary that ∀s1 ∈ S{0, ∅}, either E[θ1|ms1 ] = 0 < s1 ≤
E[θ1|m∗1(e∗1, s1)] or E[θ1|ms1 ] = 0 < s1 ≤ E[θ1|m∗1(e∗1, s1)] must hold.
By replacing “the beliefs of agent j” (µij) with “the beliefs of the principal (µ1p)”, the rest
of the proof follows exactly the same steps as in the case of decentralization (see the proof of
Proposition 1(ii)). 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Analogous to the proof of Proposition 2.
A.5 Comparative Statics of ed and ecF
In this section, we will formally show that the equilibrium effort levels under decentralization
and centralization (ed and ecF ) are both decreasing in δ. Let us define
D(δ) ≡ δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
(A.22)
and, for every λ ∈ (0, 1),
C(δ, λ) ≡ δ
2(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2δλ2(1− λ)2
2(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 . (A.23)
Differentiating with respect to δ, we have
D′(δ) =
(2δ + 1)(1 + 2δ)− 4(δ2 + δ)
(1 + 2δ)3
=
1
(1 + 2δ)3
> 0, (A.24)
and
∂C(δ, λ)
∂δ
=
[2δ(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2λ2(1− λ)2] · (λ(1− λ) + δ)− 2[δ2(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2δλ2(1− λ)2]
2(λ(1− λ) + δ)3
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=
λ3(1− λ)3 + δλ(1− λ)(λ2 + (1− λ)2 − λ(1− λ))
(λ(1− λ) + δ)3
=
λ3(1− λ)3 + δλ(1− λ)((2λ− 1)2 + λ(1− λ))
(λ(1− λ) + δ)3
> 0. (A.25)
Thus, both functions D(δ) and C(δ, λ) are increasing in δ, for all λ ∈ (0, 1). This further
implies that both ed and ecF are decreasing in δ, because
ed = (c′)−1
(
(1−D(δ)) qσ2θ
)
, ecF = (c
′)−1
(
(1− Eλ [C(δ, λ)]) qσ2θ
)
, (A.26)
and the cost function c is strictly increasing and convex.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 1
First, suppose that corr(η1, η2) = 1. Since the distribution F is symmetric in η1 and η2, for
the global states to be perfectly and positively correlated, we must have Pr (η1 = η2) = 1, and
thus Pr
(
λ = 1
2
)
= 1, where λ = η1/(η1 + η2). In this case, the RHS of condition (4.1) becomes
CF (δ) =
δ2
(
1
4
+ 1
4
)
+ 2δ · 1
4
· 1
4
2
(
1
4
+ δ
)2 = 4δ2 + δ(1 + 4δ)2 = δ1 + 4δ .
∀δ > 0, we have
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
>
δ
1 + 4δ
⇐⇒ (1 + δ)(1 + 4δ)
(1 + 2δ)2
> 1
⇐⇒ 1 + 5δ + 4δ
2
1 + 4δ + 4δ2
> 1,
which always holds. Therefore, when corr(η1, η2) = 1, we have D(δ) > CF (δ) ∀δ > 0, i.e.,
condition (4.1) is always violated. From the arguments in the main text, this immediately
implies that ed < ecF ∀δ > 0.
Next, consider the case corr(η1, η2) < 1. Taking the limit of both sides of (4.1) with respect
to δ, we obtain
lim
δ→+∞
D(δ) = lim
δ→+∞
1 + 1
δ(
1
δ
+ 2
)2 = 14 ,
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and
lim
δ→+∞
CF (δ) = lim
δ→+∞
E
(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2λ2(1−λ)2δ
2
(
λ(1−λ)
δ
+ 1
)2
 = E [λ2 + (1− λ)2
2
]
= E
[
λ2
]
,
where the last equality follows that the distribution of λ must be symmetric around 1/2. Since
corr(η1, η2) < 1, the distribution of λ cannot be degenerate, and thus by Jensen’s inequality
we further have
lim
δ→+∞
CF (δ) > (E [λ])2 =
1
4
= lim
δ→+∞
D(δ).
Therefore, by continuity there must exist δ¯1 < +∞, such that D(δ) < CF (δ) ∀δ > δ¯1. Since
ed > eCF ⇐⇒ D(δ) < CF (δ), it immediately follows that ed > ecF ∀δ > δ¯1.
To show that the effort difference ed− ecF is increasing in δ for sufficiently large δ, note that
∂(ed − ecF )
∂δ
=
−D′(δ)qσ2θ
c′′ ((c′)−1 ((1−D(δ)) qσ2θ))
− −C
′
F (δ)qσ
2
θ
c′′ ((c′)−1 ((1− CF (δ)) qσ2θ))
.
Since the cost function c is strictly convex, and both D′(δ) and C ′F (δ) are strictly positive (see
Section A.5), the above partial derivative is strictly positive if and only if
C ′F (δ)
D′(δ)
>
c′′ ((c′)−1 ((1− CF (δ)) qσ2θ))
c′′ ((c′)−1 ((1−D(δ)) qσ2θ))
. (A.27)
For the RHS of (A.27), we have
lim
δ→+∞
c′′ ((c′)−1 ((1− CF (δ)) qσ2θ))
c′′ ((c′)−1 ((1−D(δ)) qσ2θ))
=
c′′ ((c′)−1 ((1− E[λ2]) qσ2θ))
c′′
(
(c′)−1
(
3
4
· qσ2θ
)) < +∞.
Using the calculation results from Section A.5 (see (A.24) and (A.25)), we also have
lim
δ→+∞
C ′F (δ)
D′(δ)
= lim
δ→+∞
E
[
λ(1− λ)(1 + 2δ)3
(λ(1− λ) + δ)3 ·
(
λ2(1− λ)2 + δ((2λ− 1)2 + λ(1− λ)))]
= lim
δ→+∞
E
λ(1− λ)(1δ + 2)3(
λ(1−λ)
δ
+ 1
)3 · (λ2(1− λ)2 + δ((2λ− 1)2 + λ(1− λ)))

= lim
δ→+∞
E
[
8λ(1− λ) · (λ2(1− λ)2 + δ((2λ− 1)2 + λ(1− λ)))]
= E
[
8λ3(1− λ)3]+ E [λ(1− λ)(2λ− 1)2 + λ2(1− λ)2] · lim
δ→+∞
δ
= +∞.
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Therefore, by continuity, there must exist δ¯2 < +∞, such that (A.27) holds for all δ > δ¯2.
Equivalently, the effort difference ed − ecF must be increasing in δ for all δ > δ¯2.
Finally, we complete the proof of the theorem by letting δ¯ ≡ max{δ¯1, δ¯2}.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 2
To simplify the algebra, let us define
α ≡ η1η2
(η1 + η2)2
= λ(1− λ), β ≡ η
2
1 + η
2
2
(η1 + η2)2
= λ2 + (1− λ)2 (A.28)
and
∆F (δ) ≡ CF (δ)−D(δ) = E
[
δ2β + 2δα2
2(α + δ)2
]
− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
.
From (A.24) and (A.25), we have
∆′F (δ) = E
[
α3 + δα(β − α)
(α + δ)3
]
− 1
(1 + 2δ)3
.
Further, the second derivative of ∆F (δ) is given by
∆′′F (δ) = E
[
α2β − 4α3 − 2α(β − α)δ
(α + δ)4
]
+
6
(1 + 2δ)4
.
Therefore,
∆F (0) = 0, ∆
′
F (0) = E
[
α3
α3
]
− 1 = 0,
and
∆′′F (0) = E
[
α2β − 4α3
α4
]
+ 6
= E
[
1
λ2
+
1
(1− λ)2 −
4
λ(1− λ)
]
+ 6
= E
[(
1
λ
− 1
1− λ
)2
− 2
λ(1− λ)
]
+ 6
= E
[
2
λ2
− 4
λ(1− λ)
]
+ 6,
where the last equality follows that λ is symmetrically distributed around 1/2. Note that
∆′′F (0) > 0 ⇐⇒ E
[
1
λ2
]
> E
[
2
λ(1− λ)
]
− 3.
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Hence, if the condition of Theorem 2 is satisfied, then ∆′′F (0) > 0. Since ∆′F (0) = 0, by
continuity, there must exists δ˜ > 0 such that ∆′F (δ) > 0 for all δ ∈
(
0, δ˜
)
. Since ∆F (0) = 0,
and ∆F is strictly increasing on
(
0, δ˜
)
, then again by continuity there must exist δ ∈ (0,+∞],
such that ∆F (δ) > 0 for all δ ∈ (0, δ). This immediately implies that ed > ecF ∀δ ∈ (0, δ).
A.8 Proof of Theorem 3
Using Propositions 1 and 2, we can compute the expected performance of each division i ∈
{1, 2} in the fully revealing equilibrium under decentralization, which is given by
Πdi (e
d, ydi , y
d
j ) = K − σ2θ + ed
(
1− 2δ
2 + 2δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
σ2θ .
Exploiting that F is symmetric in η and the decision rules yd = (yd1 , yd2) are independent of η,
we then obtain the expected payoff of the principal under decentralization:
ΠdP = E
[
η1Π
d
1(e
d,yd) + η2Π
d
2(e
d,yd)
]
= 2E[ηi]Πdi (ed,yd)
= 2µ
(
K − σ2θ + ed
(
1− 2δ
2 + 2δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
σ2θ
)
,
where µ ≡ E[ηi] > 0, ∀i = 1, 2.
We next derive the equilibrium payoff of the principal under centralization, which we will
denote as ΠcP . Under decentralization, each agent invests ei = ecF in acquiring information,
and the decision rules are yc = (yc1, yc2) as described in Proposition 4. Hence, for each agent i
and a given pair of global states (η1, η2), the expected performance of the two divisions are
Πc1(e
c
F , y
c,η) = K − σ2θ + ecF
(
1− 2δ
2 + 2δλ2(
λ+ δ
1−λ
)2
)
σ2θ ,
Πc2(e
c
F , y
c,η) = K − σ2θ + ecF
(
1− 2δ
2 + 2δ(1− λ)2(
1− λ+ δ
λ
)2
)
σ2θ ,
where we recall that λ = η1/(η1 + η2). Exploiting the symmetry of F , we have
ΠcP = E [η1Πc1(ecF , yc,η) + η2Πc2(ecF , yc,η)]
= 2µ
[
K − σ2θ + ecF
(
1− 1
µ
(
E
[
η1 · δ
2 + δλ2(
λ+ δ
1−λ
)2
]
+ E
[
η2 · δ
2 + δ(1− λ)2(
1− λ+ δ
λ
)2
]))
σ2θ
]
= 2µ
K − σ2θ + ecF
1− 1
µ
E
δ2 · η1η2η1+η2 + δ · η21η22(η1+η2)3(
η1η2
(η1+η2)2
+ δ
)2

σ2θ
 .
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Therefore, ΠdP > ΠcP if and only if the following inequality holds:
ed
ecF
> RF (δ) ≡
1− 1
µ
E
δ2 · η1η2η1+η2 + δ · η21η22(η1+η2)3(
η1η2
(η1+η2)2
+ δ
)2

/(1− 2δ2 + 2δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
. (A.29)
Note that
lim
δ→+∞
RF (δ) = 2− 2
µ
E
[
η1η2
η1 + η2
]
< 2,
and
lim
δ→+∞
ed
ecF
= lim
δ→+∞
(c′)−1 ((1−D(δ)) qσ2θ)
(c′)−1 ((1− CF (δ))qσ2θ)
=
(c′)−1 (0.75qσ2θ)
(c′)−1
((
1− E
[(
η1
η1+η2
)2])
qσ2θ
) > 1,
where D(δ) and CF (δ) are defined in (4.1), and the last inequality follows Theorem 1. Thus, the
value of limδ→ ed/ecF is strictly large than 1, and it is increasing as the term E [(η1/(η1 + η2))2]
increases. Let ε ≡ (E [(η1/(η1 + η2))2]− 0.25) qσ2θ , which is strictly positive given the assump-
tion corr(η1, η2) < 1. Using Taylor’s theorem, we obtain
(c′)−1
((
1− E
[(
η1
η1 + η2
)2])
qσ2θ
)
= (c′)−1
(
0.75qσ2θ
)− ε
c′′((c′)−1(0.75qσ2θ))
+ o
(
ε2
)
.
Since c′′(e) · e < ζ ∀e ∈ [0, 1], we further have
(c′)−1
((
1− E
[(
η1
η1 + η2
)2])
qσ2θ
)
≤ ζ − ε
c′′((c′)−1(0.75qσ2θ))
+ o
(
ε2
)
. (A.30)
When ε is sufficiently small, the value of the higher order terms in o(ε2) can be neglected. Thus,
if ζ is sufficiently close to (but still larger than) ε, the LHS of (A.30) becomes arbitrarily close to
zero (but it is still strictly positive). Hence, if the bound ζ is sufficiently close to ε > 0, then for
the case with small enough ε (i.e., ε ≤ ε¯, where ε¯ is some strictly positive cutoff) we must have
limδ→+∞ ed/ecF > limδ→+∞RF (δ).31 But then, because the value of limδ→+∞ ed/ecF is strictly
increasing in E[(η1/(η1 + η2))2], and thus also in ε, with the same bound ζ we will also have
limδ→+∞ ed/ecF > limδ→+∞RF (δ) for all ε ≥ ε¯. By continuity, it follows that ed/ecF > RF (δ)
for sufficiently large δ. We can conclude that if ζ is sufficiently small, then there must exist
31The assumption that “the marginal cost is sufficiently small at e = 0 ... so that the agents will endogenously
choose to be partially informed (ei ∈ (0, 1) in equilibrium”, which is stated in Section 2, implicitly restricts that
ζ cannot be too small. Otherwise, we may have the RHS of (A.30) being negative, which implies that in the
limit the agents would actually choose to be not informed at all under centralization (limδ→+∞ ecF = 0). In this
case, if we still have limδ→+∞ ed = (c′)−1(0.75qσ2θ) > 0, i.e., the agents would still want to exert some effort
under decentralization, then obviously the statement limδ→+∞ ed/ecF > limδ→+∞RF (δ) will also hold.
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δ¯ > 0, such that ΠdP > ΠcP if δ > δ¯.
A.9 Proof of Theorem 4
In the proof of Theorem 2, it is shown that if the condition E
[
1
λ2
]
> E
[
2
λ(1−λ)
]
− 3 is satisfied,
then there exists δ > 0, such that CF (δ) > D(δ) ∀δ ∈ (0, δ). Using arguments that are
analogous to those in the proof of Theorem 3, we can further show that, for every of such δ
there must exist a cutoff ζ(δ) > 0, such that if c′′(e) ·e < ζ(δ) ∀e ∈ [0, 1], then we will also have
ed
ecF
=
(c′)−1 ((1−D(δ)) qσ2θ)
(c′)−1 ((1− CF (δ)) qσ2θ)
> RF (δ),
which, according to (A.29), is both necessary and sufficient for ΠdP > ΠcP .
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B Proofs of Additional Results
B.1 Proof of Proposition 5
By part (i) of Theorem 1, we know that if ω = 0, then ed < ecF ∀δ > 0. In this case, we let
δ(ω) = 0 and δ¯(ω) = +∞.
Now consider the functionsD(δ) and CF (δ) as defined in (4.1). For every binary distribution
Fω with ω ∈ [0, 1), define
∆(δ, ω) ≡ CFω(δ)−D(δ) =
δ2 · 1+ω2
2
+ 2δ ·
(
1−ω2
4
)2
2
(
1−ω2
4
+ δ
)2 − δ2 + δ(1 + 2δ)2 . (B.1)
Since ∆(0, ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ [0, 1), the equation ∆(δ, ω) = 0 always has a root δ = 0. To ease
the exposition of the algebra, we again use the variables defined in (A.28), which are now given
by α = (1− ω2)/4 and β = (1 + ω2)/2. Provided that δ > 0, we have for all ω ∈ (0, 1),
∆(δ, ω) = 0
⇐⇒ (βδ + 2α
2)(1 + 2δ)2 − 2(δ + 1)(α + δ)2
2(α + δ)2(1 + 2δ)2
= 0
⇐⇒ (βδ + 2α2)(4δ2 + 4δ + 1)− (2δ + 2)(α2 + δ2 + 2αδ) = 0
⇐⇒ (4β − 2)δ3 + (8α2 − 4α + 4β − 2)δ2 + (6α2 − 4α + β)δ = 0
⇐⇒ (4β − 2)δ2 + (8α2 − 4α + 4β − 2)δ + (6α2 − 4α + β) = 0
⇐⇒
(
δ +
4α2 − 2α + 2β − 1
4β − 2
)2
=
(4α2 − 2α + 2β − 1)2 − (6α2 − 4α + β)(4β − 2)
(4β − 2)2
⇐⇒
(
δ +
4α2 − 2α + 2β − 1
4β − 2
)2
=
(1− 2α)2(4α2 − 2β + 1)
(4β − 2)2 , (B.2)
where the fifth equivalence follows that 4β − 2 = 2 + 2ω2 − 2 = 2ω2 > 0. In addition,
we can verify that the RHS of (B.2) is strictly negative if ω >
√
2 − 1. This is because
(1− 2α)2 = (1 + ω2)2/4 > 0, and
4α2 − 2β + 1 = (1− ω
2)2
4
− ω2 =
(
1− ω2
2
+ ω
)(
1− ω2
2
− ω
)
,
which, given that ω ∈ (0, 1), will be positive if and only if 1 − ω2 − 2ω ≥ 0, or, equivalently,
ω ≤ √2 − 1. Hence, if ω > √2 − 1, the equation ∆(δ, ω) = 0 does not have any non-zero
root on [0,+∞), and Theorem 1 implies that we must have ∆(δ, ω) > 0 for all δ > 0. Since
ed > ecF ⇐⇒ ∆(δ, ω) > 0, part (ii) of the proposition immediately follows.
Next, suppose that ω ∈ (0,√2 − 1]. In this case, the equation ∆(δ, ω) = 0 admits the
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following two non-zero roots
δ(ω) = −4α
2 − 2α + 2β − 1
4β − 2 −
(1− 2α)√4α2 − 2β + 1
4β − 2 , and
δ¯(ω) = −4α
2 − 2α + 2β − 1
4β − 2 +
(1− 2α)√4α2 − 2β + 1
4β − 2 .
In addition, we note that
4α2 − 2α + 2β − 1 = (1− ω
2)2
4
− 1− ω
2
2
+ 1 + ω2 − 1 = ω
4 + 4ω2 − 1
4
,
which is clearly increasing in ω, and it is approximately equal to −0.07 when ω = √2 − 1.
Thus, the term −(4α2− 2α+ 2β− 1)/(4β− 2) must be strictly positive for all ω ∈ (0,√2− 1].
This implies that if ω =
√
2−1, the equation ∆(δ, ω) = 0 will actually admit two identical and
strictly positive roots, i.e., δ¯(ω) = δ(ω) > 0. By continuity, we must have ∆(δ,
√
2 − 1) > 0
(and thus ed > ecF ) for all δ ∈ (0, δ(ω)) ∪ (δ¯(ω),+∞).
If ω <
√
2 − 1, from the above analysis we know that δ¯(ω) > max{δ(ω), 0}. Thus, by
continuity and part (ii) of Theorem 1, it follows that ∆(δ, ω) > 0 for all δ > δ¯(ω). In addition,
since limω→0 4β − 2 = limω→0 ω2 = 0, it is straightforward to verify that limω→0 δ¯(ω) = +∞.
As for the interval [max{0, δ(ω)}, δ¯(ω)], because we have δ¯(ω) > δ(ω), 4α2 − 2β + 1 > 0, and
∆(δ, ω) < 0 if(
δ − δ¯(ω) + (1− 2α)
√
4α2 − 2β + 1
4β − 2
)2
<
(2α− 1)2(4α2 − 2β + 1)
(4β − 2)2 ,
it is necessarily the case that ∆(δ, ω) < 0 for δ = δ¯(ω)−ε > 0, where ε > 0 is sufficiently small.
Hence, we must have ∆(δ, ω) ≤ 0 for all δ ∈ [max{0, δ(ω)}, δ¯(ω)].
It remains to show that ∆(δ, ω) > 0 for all δ ∈ (0,max{0, δ(ω)}). We note that
δ(ω) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ − 4α
2 − 2α + 2β − 1
4β − 2 ≤
(1− 2α)√4α2 − 2β + 1
4β − 2
⇐⇒ (4α2 − 2α + 2β − 1)2 ≤ (1− 2α)2(4α2 − 2β + 1)
⇐⇒ 6α2 − 4α + β ≤ 0
⇐⇒ 3(1− ω
2)2
8
− 1− 3ω
2
2
≤ 0,
⇐⇒ (1− ω2)2 − 4(1− ω2) + 4− 4
3
4
3
≤ 0
⇐⇒ (1− ω2 − 2)2 − 4
3
≤ 0
⇐⇒ (1 + ω2)2 − 4
3
≤ 0,
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where the second equivalence holds because, as we have shown above, 4α2 − 2α + 2β − 1 < 0
and 4β − 2 > 0 for all ω ∈ (0,√2− 1). Clearly, the equation (1 + ω2)2− 4/3 = 0 has a unique
real root on (0, 1), which is given by
ωˆ =
√
2
√
3
3
− 1 ≈ 0.393.
It is also straightforward to check that δ(ω) < 0 if ω < ωˆ, and δ(ω) > 0 if ω ∈ (ωˆ,√2 − 1).
Thus, the claim that ∆(δ, ω) > 0 for all δ ∈ (0,max{0, δ(ω)}) holds trivially if ω ∈ (0, ωˆ). As
for the case ω ∈ (ωˆ,√2− 1), note that the inequality ∆(δ, ω) > 0 can be rewritten as(
δ − δ(ω)− (1− 2α)
√
4α2 − 2β + 1
4β − 2
)2
>
(2α− 1)2(4α2 − 2β + 1)
(4β − 2)2 .
But then, given that we have shown 1− 2α > 0 and 4α2 − 2β + 1 > 0, it immediately follows
that we also have ∆(δ, ω) > 0 for all δ ∈ (0,max{δ(ω), 0}) in this case.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider the function ∆(δ, ω) defined in (B.1). For every δ > 0, we have
∂∆(δ, ω)
∂ω
=
[8δ2ω + δ(4ω3 − 4ω)](1− ω2 + 4δ)− [4δ2(1 + ω2) + 2δ(ω4 − 2ω2 + 1)](−4ω)
(1− ω2 + 4δ)3
≥ δ(4ω
3 − 4ω)(1− ω2) + 8δω(ω4 − 2ω2 + 1)
(1− ω2 + 4δ)3 +
4δ2(4ω3 − 4ω) + 16δ2ω(1 + ω2)
(1− ω2 + 4δ)3
=
4δω(1− ω2)2
(1− ω2 + 4δ)3 +
32δ2ω3
(1− ω2 + 4δ)3 ,
which is strictly positive for all ω ∈ (0, 1). Thus, ∆(δ, ω) is strictly increasing in ω. Since
∆(δ, 1) =
1
2
− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
> 0 >
4δ2 + δ
(1 + 4δ)2
− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
= ∆(δ, 0),
there must exist a unique cutoff ωˆ(δ) ∈ (0, 1), such that ∆(δ, ω) > 0 if and only if ω > ωˆ(δ).
To obtain the exact analytic form of the cutoff, we expand the equation ∆(δ, ω) = 0:
∆(δ, ω) = 0⇐⇒ 2ω2δ2 + ω
4 + 4ω2 − 1
2
· δ + 3ω
4 + 6ω2 − 1
8
= 0
⇐⇒ (4δ + 3)ω4 + (16δ2 + 16δ + 6)ω2 − 4δ − 1 = 0
⇐⇒ω4 + 16δ
2 + 16δ + 6
4δ + 3
ω2 − 4δ + 1
4δ + 3
= 0
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⇐⇒
(
ω2 + 2δ +
2δ + 3
4δ + 3
)2
=
4δ + 1
4δ + 3
+
(
2δ +
2δ + 3
4δ + 3
)2
⇐⇒
(
ω2 + 2δ +
2δ + 3
4δ + 3
)2
=
64δ4 + 128δ3 + 128δ2 + 64δ + 12
(4δ + 3)2
⇐⇒
(
ω2 + 2δ +
2δ + 3
4δ + 3
)2
=
(4δ + 2)2(4δ2 + 4δ + 3)
(4δ + 3)2
. (B.3)
For every δ > 0, equation (B.3) has a unit root on [0, 1], which is given by
ωˆ(δ) =
√
(4δ + 2)
√
4δ2 + 4δ + 3− 2δ − 3
4δ + 3
− 2δ.
To prove the remaining claims of the theorem, let us denote
Z(δ) =
(4δ + 2)
√
4δ2 + 4δ + 3− 2δ − 3
4δ + 3
− 2δ
=
(
1− 1
4δ + 3
)√
4δ2 + 4δ + 3− 2δ + 3
4δ + 3
− 2δ,
and thus ωˆ(δ) =
√
Z(δ). Differentiating with respect to δ, we obtain
Z ′(δ) =
4
√
4δ2 + 4δ + 3
(4δ + 3)2
+
(4δ + 2)2
4δ + 3
· (4δ2 + 4δ + 3)− 12 + 6
(4δ + 3)2
− 2,
It is easy to verify that Z ′(0) > 0. In addition, using Mathematica, one can also check that
there is a unique solution to Z ′(δ) = 0 on (0,+∞), which is δ∗ =
√
2
2
− 1
2
, and it satisfies
ωˆ(δ∗) =
√
2 − 1. Hence, by continuity, we must have Z ′(δ) > 0 ∀δ ∈ (0, δ∗), and Z ′(δ) > 0
∀δ ∈ (δ∗,+∞). This further implies that the cutoff ωˆ(δ) must be strictly increasing on (0, δ∗),
and strictly decreasing on (δ∗,+∞). It is also straightforward to verify that limδ→+∞ Z(δ) = 0,
and thus limδ→+∞ ωˆ(δ) = 0.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 7
Decentralization Let us first consider part (i) of the proposition. We argue that the pro-
posed equilibrium effort profile (e∗1, e∗2) = (eˇd, eˇd), the fully revealing communication strategies
(mˇd1, mˇ
d
2), and the decision rules (yˇd1 , yˇd2) described below constitute a PBE, where the beliefs
of the players will be fully pinned down Bayes’ rule. Specifically, the decision rules are similar
to the ones in Proposition 1, and they are given by
yˇdi (ei, si,mi,mj) =
E[θi|si]
1 + δ
+
δ2E[θi|mi]
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
+
δE[θj|mj]
1 + 2δ
,
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∀ei ∈ E, ∀si,mi,mj ∈ R∪{∅}, and ∀i, j = 1, 2, where for each i ∈ {1, 2} E[θi|mi] is the posterior
expectation of the local state θi conditional on si = mi/td if mi 6= ∅, and it is conditional on
si = ∅ otherwise. To prove Proposition 7(i), we will suppose that agent j is playing according
to (eˇd, mˇdj , yˇdj ), and then show that it is a best response for agent i to also adopt the proposed
strategy.
Taking the first stage effort ei, the signal si received, and the message mi sent as given, we
can solve agent i’s utility-maximizing problem at the decision-making stage as in the proof of
Proposition 1, and obtain the decision rule yˇdi as a solution. Thus, given agent j’s strategy and
the corresponding beliefs, the decision rule yˇdi is sequentially rational for agent i.
Next, we take the decision rule yˇdi , effort ei and signal si as given, and consider agent i’s
strategic incentives when communicating his private information with agent j. We start by
showing that when agent i receives a non-null signal si ∈ R, he will prefer to send message
mdi (ei, si) = t
dsi than any other message mi ∈ R. Note that since agent j will follow the
proposed fully revealing communicating strategy, agent i can always infer the realization of
agent j’s signal sj (which is equal to mj/td if mj 6= ∅, and it is equal to ∅ otherwise). Thus for
every message mi ∈ R sent by agent i (which may or may not equal to mˇdi (ei, si)), sequential
rationality implies that the agents will choose the following actions:
yi =
θi
1 + δ
+
δ2(mi/t
d)
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
+
δE[θj|sj]
1 + 2δ
, yj =
(1 + δ)E[θj|sj] + δ(mi/td)
1 + 2δ
,
where E[θj|sj] = 0 if sj = ∅, and θj = sj otherwise. Thus, given any effort ej ∈ E chosen by
agent j, conditional on sending the message mi ∈ R, the expected performance of division i is
Π˜di (mi, θi, ej) = ejEθj [p˜id1(mi, θi, θj)] + (1− ej)p˜idi (mi, θi, ∅) ,
where
p˜idi (mi, θi, θj) =K −
(
(δ + 2δ2)θi − (mi/td)δ2
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
− δ
1 + 2δ
· θj
)2
− δ
(
(1 + 2δ)θi − (mi/td)δ
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
− 1
1 + 2δ
· θj
)2
and p˜idi (mi, θi, ∅) = p˜idi (mi, θi, θj)|θj=0. Differentiating with respect to mi, we have, ∀θj ∈ R,
∂Eθj [p˜idi (mi, θi, θj)]
∂mi
= − Eθj
[
2
(
(δ + 2δ2)θi − (mi/td)δ2
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
− δ
1 + 2δ
· θj
)( −δ2/td
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
)]
− δEθj
[
2
(
(1 + 2δ)θi − (mi/td)δ
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
− 1
1 + 2δ
· θj
)( −δ/td
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
)]
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=
2δ2
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
·
(
(δ + 2δ2)θi − (mi/t)δ2 + (1 + 2δ)θi − (mi/t)
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
)
· 1
td
,
which is also equal to ∂p˜idi (mi, θi, ∅)/∂mi. Hence, we further have
∂Π˜di (mi, θi, ej)
∂mi
=
2δ2
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
·
(
(δ + 2δ2)θi − (mi/td)δ2 + (1 + 2δ)θi − (mi/td)δ
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
)
· 1
td
,
which is independent of ej. This implies that the strategic communication incentives of agent
i is independent of his belief about the effort exerted by agent j. Thus, from now on we drop
the variable ej from the function Π˜di . We distinguish the following two cases:
Case 1: si = θi = 0. It is straightforward to verify that
∂[qΠ˜di (mi, θi)]
∂mi
∣∣∣∣∣
mi=θi=0
= 0.
Since z(mˆi, 0) ≥ z(0, 0) = 0 ∀mˆi ∈ R, it immediately follows that
qΠ˜di (0, 0)− z(0, 0) ≥ q · Π˜di (mˆi, 0)− z(mˆi, 0)∀mˆi ∈ R.
Hence, when agent i learns that θi = 0, he always prefer to send mi = 0 than any other mˆi ∈ R.
Case 2: si = θi 6= 0. Suppose first that θi > 0. Consider any message that mi ≥ θi. By
(A2), sending this message will incur a cost z(mi, θi) = κ(mi−θi)2. Note that by construction,
we have td ≡ 1
2
+
√
qδ2
κ(1+2δ)2
+ 1
4
, which is larger than 1 for all δ ≥ 0, and
[
∂[qΠ˜di (mi, θi)]
∂mi
− ∂z(mi, θi)
∂mi
] ∣∣∣∣∣
mi=tdθi
= 0,
i.e., the first-order condition is satisfied exactly at mi = tdθi. This implies that if agent i learns
that the true state is θi > 0, he will prefer to send the message mi = tdθi than any other
messages mˆi ∈ [θi,+∞).
It remains to show that agent i will also prefer mi = tdθi than any message mˆi ∈ [0, θi).
This is indeed the case, because ∂Π˜
d
i (mi,θi)
∂mi
> 0 ∀mi ∈ [0, θi), and, thus, ∀θi > 0 and mˆi < θi,
qΠ˜di
(
tdθi, θi
)− z(tdθi, θi) ≥ qΠ˜di (θi, θi)− z(θi, θi)
= qΠ˜di (θi, θi)
> qΠ˜di (mˆi, θi)
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≥ qΠ˜di (mˆi, θi)− z(mˆi, θi).
In sum, we have shown that for all si = θi > 0, agent i would prefer sending mi = tdθi than
any other message mˆi ∈ R. By symmetry, the same conclusion also holds for all si = θi < 0.
Since the effect on the actions chosen by the agents are the same for mˆi = 0 and mˆi = ∅, and
we allow the cost z(m, 0) to be fully general, it also follows that agent i will not find it profitable
to send mˆi = ∅ when si 6= ∅. As for the remaining scenario si = ∅, it is straightforward to
verify that the expected performance of division i conditional on agent i sending any message
mi ∈ R ∪ ∅ is the same as when he actually receives a non-null signal that si = θi = 0. Hence,
this expected performance is maximized when m1 = ∅. Trivially, the communication cost is
also minimized at m1 = ∅. Therefore, it must be optimal for agent i to send mi = ∅ whenever
si = ∅ is observed.
Finally, we take both the decision rules (yˇd1 , yˇd2) and communication strategies (mˇd1, mˇd2) as
given and consider the information acquisition problem for agent i. Given an arbitrary effort
profile (e1, e2), the expected payoff of agent i is now given by
Udi (ei, ej)− eiE
[
κ(tdθi − θi)2
]
,
where Udi (ei, ej) was defined in the proof of Proposition 1. Thus, with costly exaggeration, the
first-order condition at the information acquisition stage is(
1− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
qσ2θ − c′(ei)− κ(td − 1)2σ2θ = 0.
Solving the above equation, we obtain the proposed equilibrium effort level eˇd as a unique
solution. Therefore, given the above-mentioned decision rules and communication strategies,
choosing ei = eˇd is indeed optimal for agent i. 
Centralization For part (ii) of the proposition, we consider first the principal’s incentive at
the decision-making stage. Given the communication strategy profile (mˇc1, mˇc2), the relevant
information held by both agents will be perfectly revealed to the principal. In particular,
whenever the principal observes that mi 6= ∅, she can infer that agent i has learned about his
local state, which is given by θi = mi/tc. Thus, sequential rationality implies that the decision
rules of the principal should be similar to the ones in the proof of Proposition 3:
yˇci (mi,mj, ηi, ηj) =
ηi
ηi+ηj
·
(
ηj
ηi+ηj
+ δ
)
E [θi|mi] + δηjηi+ηjE[θj|mj]
ηi
ηi+ηj
· ηj
ηi+ηj
+ δ
,
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∀mi,mj ∈ Θ ∪ {∅}, ∀ηi, ηj ∈ [ η, η¯ ], and ∀i, j = 1, 2, where for each i ∈ {1, 2} E[θi|mi] is
the posterior expectations of the local state θi conditional on si = mi/tc if mi 6= ∅, and it is
conditional on si = ∅ otherwise.
Next, we take the above decision rules of the principal as given, and consider the strategic
incentives of the agents at the communication stage. Suppose that agent 2 plays the fully
revealing communication strategy mc2. We start by showing that when receiving a non-null
signal s1 ∈ R, agent 1 will prefer to send m1 = tcs1 than any other message mˆ1 ∈ R. In
particular, suppose that agent 1 learns that his local state is θ1 ∈ R, then by sending an
arbitrary message m1 ∈ R he will induce the following contingent actions of the principal:
yc1 =
(λ(1− λ) + λδ) · (m1/tc) + (1− λ)δE[θ2|s2]
λ(1− λ) + δ
and
yc2 =
(λ(1− λ) + (1− λ)δ)E[θ2|s2] + λδ · (m1/tc)
λ(1− λ) + δ ,
where λ = η1/(η1 + η2), E[θ2|s2] = 0 if s2 = ∅, and θ2 = s2 (and thus E[θ2|s2] = s2) otherwise.
Note that we can write the action of the principal as a function of agent 2’s private signal
because agent 2 s communication strategy is fully revealing.
Given any effort e2 ∈ E chosen by agent 2, and any realization of the profitability conditions
η1, η2 ∈ [ η, η¯ ], conditional on sending a message mi ∈ R the expected performance of agent 1
is
Π˜c1(m1, θ1, e2,η) = e2Eθ2 [p˜ic1(m1, θ2,η)] + (1− e2)p˜ic1(m1, ∅,η),
where
p˜ic1(m1, θ2,η) =K −
(
(λ(1− λ) + δ)θ1 − (λ(1− λ) + λδ) · (m1/tc)
λ(1− λ) + δ −
(1− λ)δ
λ(1− λ) + δ · θ2
)2
− δ
(
λ(1− λ) · (m1/tc − θ2)
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
and p˜ic1(m1, ∅,η) = p˜ic1(m1, θ2,η)|θ2=0. Differentiating with respect to m1, we have, ∀θ2 ∈ R,
∂Eθ2 [p˜ic1(m1, θ2,η)]
∂m1
=Eθ2
[
2
(
(λ(1− λ) + δ)θ1 − (λ(1− λ) + λδ) · (m1/tc)− (1− λ)δθ2
λ(1− λ) + δ
)(
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)/tc
λ(1− λ) + δ
)]
− Eθ2
[
2δ
(
λ(1− λ) · (m1/tc − θ2)
λ(1− λ) + δ
)(
λ(1− λ)/tc
λ(1− λ) + δ
)]
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= 2
(
(λ(1− λ) + δ)θ1 − (λ(1− λ) + λδ) · (m1/tc)
λ(1− λ) + δ
)(
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)/tc
λ(1− λ) + δ
)
− 2δ
(
λ(1− λ) · (m1/tc)
λ(1− λ) + δ
)(
λ(1− λ)/tc
λ(1− λ) + δ
)
,
which is also equal to ∂p˜ic1(m1, ∅,η)/∂m1. Hence, we further have
∂Π˜c1(m1, θ1, e2,η)
∂m1
=2
(
(λ(1− λ) + δ)θ1 − (λ(1− λ) + λδ) · (mˆ1/tc)
λ(1− λ) + δ
)(
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)/tc
λ(1− λ) + δ
)
− 2δ
(
λ(1− λ) · (mˆ1/tc)
λ(1− λ) + δ
)(
λ(1− λ)/tc
λ(1− λ) + δ
)
,
which is independent of e2. This implies that the strategic communication incentives of agent 1 is
independent of his belief about the effort exerted by agent 2. Thus, from now on we drop the variable
e2 from the function Π˜c1. We distinguish the following two cases:
Case 1: si = θi = 0. It is straightforward to verify that
∂[qΠ˜c1(m1, θ1,η)]
∂m1
∣∣∣∣∣
m1=θ1=0
= 0 ∀η1, η2 ∈ [ η, η¯ ].
Since z(mˆ1, 0) ≥ z(0, 0) = 0 ∀mˆ1 ∈ R, it immediately follows that
qEη
[
Π˜c1(0, 0,η)
]
− z(0, 0) ≥ Eη
[
Π˜c1(mˆ1, 0,η)
]
− z(mˆ1, 0)∀mˆ1 ∈ R.
Hence, when agent 1 learns that θi = 0, he always prefer to send m1 = tcθ1 = 0 than any other
message mˆ1 ∈ R.
Case 2: si = θi 6= 0. Suppose first that θi > 0. Consider any message that m1 ≥ θ1. By (A2),
sending this message will incur a cost z(m1, θ1) = κ(m1 − θ1)2. Note that by construction, we have
tc = 12 +
√
E
[
qλ(1−λ)[2δ2+δ(λ2+(1−λ)2)]
κ(λ(1−λ)+δ)2
]
+ 14 , which is larger than 1 for all δ ≥ 0, and
∂Eη
[
qΠ˜c1(m1, θ1,η)
]
∂m1
− ∂z(m1, θ1)
∂m1
 ∣∣∣∣∣
m1=tcθ1
= 0,
i.e., the first-order condition is satisfied exactly at mi = tcθi.32 This implies that if agent 1 learns
that the true state is θ1 > 0 and the principal expects him to send messages according to the fully
revealing communication rule mˇc1, then agent 1 will indeed prefer to send the message m1 = tcθ1 than
any other messages mˆ1 ∈ [θ1,+∞).
It remains to show that agent 1 will also prefer m1 = tcθ1 than any message mˆ1 ∈ [0, θ1). This is
32To arrive at the expression of tc, we exploit that the symmetry of the distribution of λ and observe that
Eλ
[
λ(1−λ)δ2+λ(1−λ)3δ
(λ(1−λ)+δ)2
]
= E
[
λ(1−λ)[2δ2+δ(λ2+(1−λ)2)]
2(λ(1−λ)+δ)2
]
.
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indeed the case, because ∀m1 ∈ [0, θ1) and ∀η1, η2 ∈ [ η, η¯ ],
∂Π˜c1(m1, θ1,η)
∂m1
≥ 2
(
(λ(1− λ) + δ) (θ1 −m1/tc)
λ(1− λ) + δ
)(
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)/tc
λ(1− λ) + δ
)
> 0,
and, thus, ∀θ1 > 0 and mˆ1 < θ1,
qEη
[
Π˜c1 (t
cθ1, θ1,η)
]
− z(tcθ1, θ1) ≥ qEη
[
Π˜c1 (θ1, θ1,η)
]
− z(θ1, θ1)
= qEη
[
Π˜c1 (θ1, θ1,η)
]
> qEη
[
Π˜c1 (mˆ1, θ1,η)
]
≥ qEη
[
Π˜c1 (mˆ1, θ1,η)
]
− z(mˆ1, θ1).
In sum, we have shown that for all s1 = θi > 0, agent 1 would prefer sending m1 = tcs1 than any
other message mˆ1 ∈ R. By symmetry, the same conclusion also holds for all s1 < 0.
Since the effect on the actions chosen by the principal are the same for mˆ1 = 0 and mˆ1 = ∅, and
we allow the cost z(m, 0) to be fully general, it also follows from the argument in Case 1 that agent
1 will not find it profitable to send mˆ1 = ∅ when s1 6= ∅. As for the remaining scenario s1 = ∅, it is
straightforward to verify that the expected performance of division 1 conditional on agent 1 sending
any message mˆ1 is the same as when he actually receives a non-null signal of s1 = θ1 = 0. Hence, this
expected performance is maximized when mˆ1 = ∅. Trivially, the communication cost is also minimized
when mˆ1 = ∅. Therefore, it is optimal for agent 1 to report m1 = ∅ to the principal whenever s1 = ∅
is observed.
By the symmetry of distribution F , the incentive problem of agent 2 is analogous. Thus, given
that agent 1 will be fully revealing his private information to the principal, it is also a best response
for agent 2 to follow the communication strategy mˇc2.
Finally, we take both the decision rules (yˇc1, yˇc2) and the communication strategies (mˇc1, mˇc2) as
given and consider the information acquisition problem for agent i. Given an arbitrary effort profile
(e1, e2), the expected payoff of agent i is now given by
U ci (ei, ej)− eiE
[
κ(tcθi − θi)2
]
,
where U ci (ei, ej) was defined in the proof of Proposition 3. Thus, with costly exaggeration, the first-
order condition at the information acquisition stage is(
1− E
[
δ2(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2δλ2(1− λ)2
2(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ − c′(ei)− κ(tc − 1)2σ2θ = 0.
Solving the above equation, we obtain the proposed equilibrium effort level eˇcF as a unique solution.
Therefore, given the above-mentioned decision rules and communication strategies, choosing ei = eˇcF
is indeed optimal for agent i. 
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